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1. Introduction – Beyond Borders 
Access to capital and incentive to innovate play an essential role for various actors engaged 
in global commerce. Access to financing facilitated by financial markets allows companies 
to grow their business, provide employment, and offer goods and services for consumers 
which in turn fuels economic development. Maintaining incentive to innovative through 
protection of intellectual property rights ensures that inventors, authors, and manufacturers 
can reap financial gains from their intellectual work while contributing to the advancement 
of the society.1  
Yet the focus on national laws within a single country as the unit of analysis in legal 
scholarship provides insufficient understanding for global actors navigating outside the 
borders of their domicile. In addition to scholarship on international law, attempts to respond 
to the challenge of legal diversity include scholarship on global or transnational law and 
comparative law.2 The increasing global interdependency and intensified European 
integration have challenged the traditional approach of comparative law with nation versus 
nation comparisons as the basic unit of analysis.3 Although comparative law has historically 
been rooted in the Westphalian order of sovereign nations with fixed national borders, 
comparative law has been suggested to have evolved to a state where it can provide answers 
to law related questions in a world with increasingly blurring national borders.4 
This study transcends borders twofold: first, by analyzing legal framework of IP and 
financial markets crossing national borders and secondly, by cutting through two distinct 
areas of law. This study tackles questions related to access to money and incentive to 
innovate, more specifically, this study adds to the streams of comparative legal literature on 
IP (intellectual property) and financial markets by comparing the legal frameworks of IP and 
financial markets in the EU and the U.S.  
Previous studies have looked at some aspects of intellectual property rights (IPRs) or 
financial markets law in comparative context.5 Even though individual fields of law in 
                                                 
1 Pila and Torremans (2019) 3. 
2 Husa (2018) 39. 
3 See Paso and Eskola (2002) for a discussion on the methodological challenges posed by comparing EU to 
an individual nation in comparative law.  
4 Husa (2018) 40. 
5 For comparative IPR studies, see e.g. Song (2018:437–457) for a comparative study of geographical 
indications (GIs) in France, the EU, and China revealing the diversity of national approaches that are being 
developed to address GI protection within a trademark system. Dobrin and Chochia (2016) compared 
trademark exhaustion and parallel imports between the U.S. and the EU. For comparative financial markets 
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comparative context have been in the research agenda of comparatists, studies in 
comparative law covering more than one field of law have remained scarce. However, a 
handful of studies have compared more than one field of law, namely competition law and 
intellectual property law. Raju contrasted competition law and intellectual property law of 
the U.S., the EU, and India.6 He found similarities in the fundamental objectives of 
competition law and intellectual property law, namely promotion of innovations and welfare 
of society, in all of these regions.7 Raju concludes that the legislative framework is more 
advanced in EU and the U.S. so developing countries such as India should emulate the EU 
and the U.S. in formulating their IP and competition policies. However, Raju is quick to note 
that imitation should be carried out with adjustments to the specific economic and 
development goals of India. Akin to Raju, Czapracka analyzed the intersection of 
competition law and intellectual property rights from a comparative perspective.8 Akin to 
this study, her choice of regions to be compared included the EU and the U.S. 
This study sheds light to previously unanswered questions by drawing conclusions about 
similarities and differences between IP law and financial markets law in the EU and in the 
U.S. The main academic contributions of this study include systemizing commonalities and 
differences of IP law and financial markets law in the two jurisdictions with an emphasis on 
attempting to explicate the findings drawing on a pool of possible historical, political, or 
economic factors at play. I find that some of the similarities in IP law are attributable to 
international harmonization efforts and common historical roots while differences are 
explained among others by underlying theoretical differences of IP doctrine and differing 
aims of IPR protection as well as the divide concerning the role of statutory law and case 
law between the common law and Romano-Germanic law.  
Akin to IP law, similarities in financial markets law are partly explained by international 
harmonization efforts arising from similar aims with regulation but also by 
interconnectedness of both economies. In both jurisdictions banking law has been shaped by 
crises and balancing acts between centralizing and decentralizing economic power. The 
differences in financial markets law stem from differences in investor base, differing levels 
of integration of capital markets, and existence of central regulatory authority. In banking 
                                                 
law studies, see e.g. Boskovic, Cerruti, and Noel (2010) who compared the EU and U.S. securities regulatory 
framework and Stoltenberg et al.’s (2011) study where they compared the developments of internal capital 
markets in the U.S. and the EU. 
6 Raju (2014) 1–18.  
7 ibid 18. 
8 Czapracka (2009) xii. 
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law, the U.S. banking union has developed gradually over the last two centuries whereas the 
European banking union has only recently been introduced as a means of furthering financial 
integration of the EU. 
2. The Research Framework 
In the next section I will introduce the aim of the study, the research questions, and the 
research method deployed. In conjunction with discussing the methodology, I will also 
engage in methodological reflections that may have an effect on the conclusions drawn in 
the study. I will also discuss the motivation underlying the choice of regions selected for the 
comparison. Lastly, I will present the limitations of the study that in narrowing the 
substantive law covered to sharpen the focus of the study.  
2.1 The Purpose of the Study and Research Questions 
As the title of the thesis indicates, the purpose of this study is to explore IP and financial 
markets law in comparative context. More specifically, I will juxtapose legislative 
framework of IP law and financial markets law in the European Union (EU) to that of the 
United States (U.S.). The guiding research question of this study is then to discover to what 
extent do IP law and financial markets law in the European Union and in the United States 
resemble each other and to what extent they differ? In addition to detecting differences and 
similarities concerning IP law and financial markets law between these two territories, I aim 
to address also the following research question: what possible factors explain similarities 
and differences in IP law and financial markets law in the European Union and in the United 
States? Whereas the first research question mainly focuses on what are the differences and 
similarities, the second research question is about why, specifically, which reasons might 
explain the findings of the first research question. With such formulation of the research 
questions, both questions act in a symbiotic relationship complementing each other.     
2.2 Comparative Method  
Since IP law and financial markets law in the EU and the U.S. will be explored for 
differences and similarities, the very setting of this study is comparative. Without delving 
deeper into the scholarly debate on the exact nature of comparative law, in this study I will 
regard comparative law both as a research method and as an academic discipline.9 I will 
                                                 
9 For a discussion on the nature of comparative law as a research branch or a method, see e.g. Bogdan (1993) 
24–26, Gutteridge (1949) 4–5, Hahto (2001) 1290–1308, and more recently, Husa (2015:17) who notes that 
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employ a comparative research method to align the aim and the research questions with the 
methodology of this study.10 The methodological choice in favor of comparative law is 
further motivated by the openness characteristic of the comparative law of 21st century as 
this research method currently contains more degrees of freedom regarding both theory and 
methodology compared to more traditional approaches to studying law, such as legal 
dogmatics.11  
In the absence of a standardized way of conducting and writing up comparative legal 
research, ‘boilerplate’12, transparency of this particular study is increased by motivating and 
describing the methodological choices made.13 Methodological and theoretical freedom 
inherent in comparative law enable seeking answers to the research questions of this study 
with a customized approach while adhering to the basic approach of comparative legal 
method as described by the pioneering comparatist Schlesinger, that is identifying 
similarities and differences and attempting to explain reasons for the found differences and 
similarities.14 More specifically, I will to great extent follow Siems’ four-phase model of 
steps required to conduct a comparative study.15 Having first decided on the research 
questions and the legal systems to be compared, I will describe some major characteristics 
of IP law in the EU and in the U.S followed by a description of financial markets law in the 
EU and the U.S. I will concentrate on written authoritative texts from the EU and the U.S. I 
will refer to legislation but also to court cases mostly from the European Court of Justice 
(CJEU) and the U.S. Supreme Court. To complement understanding of IP law and financial 
                                                 
comparative law can be regarded both as a legal field of study or as a method depending on the purpose of 
the comparison. 
10 Prominent scholars in the field have emphasized that instead of a comparative law method, we should view 
comparative law as a bundle of comparative law methods (Örücü 2006:445–446; see also Husa 2017:1092, 
1102). The comparative law method deployed in this study is only one of many possible methods to label 
under ‘comparative law method’. Husa (2011:254) goes as far as to argue that in addition to comparative law, 
legal pluralism has also penetrated the realm of doctrinal study which in turn requires methodological 
pluralism.  
11 Husa (2013) 26–27. See also Husa (2015) 1. 
12 The metaphor of boilerplate derives from the editor of Academy of Management Journal, Pratt (2009), who 
has attempted to demystify the process of writing up qualitative research in his editorial. Akin to comparative 
law, qualitative research in organizational studies does not adhere to a single orthodox way of reporting 
research results in academic publications. However, the methodological freedom implies neither in 
organizational studies nor in comparative law that ‘anything goes’ as Husa (2015:1; 2010:709; 2006:1096) 
has throughout the years repeatedly emphasized. Ultimately, the legitimacy of a given study is determined by 
the peers in the academic field.  
13 Van Gestel, Micklitz, and Maduro (2012:17) have called for improved disclosure regarding the 
methodology deployed in legal studies. Although their criticism certainly has some merit, I suspect that a 
novice legal scholar would find it hard to realize the task they demand merely on the basis of van Gestel et 
al.’s (2012) working paper because they do not provide sufficiently concrete steps. 
14 Schlesinger (1995) 477. 
15 Siems (2018) 15. 
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markets law and to avoid the pitfall of reducing the analysis to mere case law journalism, I 
will also review legal research covering doctrine on EU law and U.S. law when necessary.16 
The description of the laws will be followed by a comparison of the laws in both regions. 
Then I will explore possible reasons for detected similarities and differences.  
This study is guided by a spirit of inquiry instead of authority orientation in the sense that, 
as stated above, after the review and comparison of relevant authoritative texts from both 
nations/regions, I will aim to explain the found differences and similarities with a 
multidisciplinary approach.17 By attempting to make sense of the results of the comparison 
with an interdisciplinary approach instead of merely adhering to legal dogmatism, I aim to 
integrate an external view to law instead of an internal view to arrive at more plausible 
explanations for the detected differences and similarities. Finally, I will compile the main 
themes emerging from the study with illustrative examples and evaluate whether they 
contribute to increasing or decreasing similarities between the two jurisdictions.   
Although lengthy reflexive disclosures with an analysis of the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions underlying the study are beyond the scope of this study, I will 
give heed to the exhortation of van Gestel and Micklitz to make my preconceptions of this 
research more explicit.18 I aim at an awareness of my own role as a researcher who by 
engaging with the material, simultaneously creates her own interpretations of the material 
and reinterprets what others have in turn interpreted. The reality constructed in this study is 
unavoidably imprinted by my Nordic legal cultural background. The description of the U.S. 
law in this study is from my perspective Auslandsrechtskunde whereas the EU law 
corresponds to some extent Inlandsrechtskunde.19 This implies that the re-presentation of 
                                                 
16 Schlag (2009:821) has heavily criticized U.S. legal research for its excessive focus on commenting on 
judicial decisions. Van Gestel and Micklitz (2014:298) have noted that legal scholars in Europe run a similar 
risk of resorting to case law journalism when it comes to CJEU’s case law.   
17 The reference to spirit of inquiry is inspired by Samuel´s (2007:236) call for comparative lawyers to 
operate both within the authority tradition as well as outside the authority tradition, what he refers to as spirit 
of inquiry, to avoid amateurish comparison. Riles (2006:775–801) has labeled this dichotomy as insider and 
outsider perspective, insiders referring to participants and outsiders to critics. Although agreeing with Samuel 
(2007) on the need for comparative lawyers to assume roles both as an insider and outsider, Patrignani 
(2017:64–65) problematizes this dichotomy as too simplistic. She asserts that a comparatist is neither a total 
insider with full knowledge of the domestic law nor a mere outsider observing the foreign law with 
ignorance.  
18 Van Gestel and Micklitz (2014) 313. 
19 The author’s home country is Finland, an EU member state since 1995. EU law and national law of EU 
member states are still distinct legal orders, they have become interwoven, for instance through principles 
such as direct applicability and direct effect, to the degree that we can talk about a common legal system 
(Rosas and Armati, 2018:14–15). In the light of this, EU law is neither purely Inlandsrechtskunde nor 
Auslandsrechtskunde. For more on Auslandsrechtskunde and Inlandsrechtskunde, see Husa (2015) 147. 
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U.S. law in this study inevitably differs from a U.S. comparatist’s re-presentation of his or 
her domestic law since the U.S. scholar would rely on his or her American assumptions.20  
Although the conclusions presented in this study are mine, they also build on other thinkers’ 
contributions as well as reflect my educational background in jurisprudence and business.21 
My extra-legal expertise certainly is ingrained in my Vorverständnis, pre-understanding, of 
the U.S. and EU law.22 Needless to say, I do not carry out this comparative study without 
any preconceptions, tabula rasa, but instead my conclusions in this study are interpretations 
imposed by my a priori schemes. Despite of this, by disclosing some potential biases I turn 
at least some of the implicit assertions into explicit. Through such methodological 
reflections, I aim to increase transparency of this research. Simultaneously, I acknowledge 
that achieving full objectivity in this or in any other comparative law study, is not merely 
lofty but outright unrealistic a goal.23 
2.3 Choice of Regions for Comparison  
Van Gestel, Micklitz, and Maduro have lamented the lack of handbooks instructing how to 
choose legal systems for comparison.24 Perhaps this is a natural outcome of the freedom 
celebrated by many comparatists. Against this background, I have taken the liberty to choose 
two legal systems whose laws and culture are most familiar to me through living and 
studying in these geographical regions. Despite of some insight into these legal systems, it 
would take a lifetime to truly familiarize myself with all the relevant laws of either of the 
                                                 
20 Glanert (2012:69) asserts that methods are inherently subjective and speculative. Drawing on a host of 
French philosophers, she argues that since any representation is generated by a situated observer, a ‘pure’ 
description of law is utopist. Although Glanert’s work offers a plausible alternative take on the role of 
method in comparative law with notion that the observer cannot be separated from the observed, her 
admonition for tangible change among comparatists is ambiguous: ‘comparatists... should renounce 
coherence and consistency and turn themselves into dilettantes in search of aestheticization’ (Glanert, 
2010:80–81). What she is in fact advocating among comparatists is a paradigmatic shift from a functionalist, 
positivist paradigm (using the term positivism here how it is understood in sociology and not in legal theory) 
characterized by objectivity and rationality to interpretive paradigm with focus on subjective experience. 
Since changing one’s scientific worldview is hardly effortless, a paradigmatic shift, aka epistemological 
break, has been likened to a spiritual conversion (Burrell and Morgan, 1979:24–25). See further Burrell and 
Morgan (1979:25–32) for differences in meta-theoretical assumptions underlying functionalist and 
interpretivist paradigms. 
21 This notion is best captured on the home page of Google Scholar where it reads: ‘Stand on the shoulders of 
giants’ (www.googlescholar.com). Naturally, on whose shoulders this study stands becomes evident in the 
sources used but my own reasoning has certainly been enriched by other thinkers whose ideas have become 
inseparable of my own. 
22 Vorverständnis refers to a person’s inherent preconceptions and reasons behind his/her assumptions (van 
Gestel and Micklitz, 2014:308). See Hassemer (2005:93) for a more through explanation on this concept. 
23 For criticism on achieving objectivity in comparative law, see e.g. Legrand (2015:405–454) and Glanert 
(2012:61–81).  
24 Van Gestel, Micklitz, and Maduro (2012) 17. 
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chosen territories.25 The territorial scope of this study encompasses two prominent players 
in the world arena, the EU and the U.S. As markets, both the EU and the U.S. are of 
substantial size and importance in a global scale even to the extent that we can talk about 
‘Europeanization’ or ‘Americanization’ when describing their deep impact on the rest of the 
world.  
Since both legal systems belong to the Western legal tradition, EU and U.S. IP and financial 
markets law lend themselves to a bilateral26 comparative study. Despite similarities 
stemming from shared Western background, there are certainly vast differences between 
these legal systems; the EU is a supranational entity with sui generis, quasi-federal legal 
system comprised of 27 member states that are at the same time independent countries 
whereas the U.S. is both a federation of 50 states with their own legislatures, executives, and 
judiciaries and a nation.27 Comparability of the EU and the U.S. legal system, achieving a 
common comparative denominator, tertium comparationis, is further enhanced by the fairly 
similar evolutionary stage of both legal systems in terms of economic, social, and legal 
aspects although according to today’s standards of comparative law, fruitful comparisons 
could be carried out even between legal systems whose developmental stage differs.28 On 
the other hand, the U.S. belongs to the common law system whereas member states of the 
EU belong for the most part to the Romano-Germanic law or ‘civil law’. Belonging to 
different legal families has important ramifications for legal-cultural features of these 
systems as in common law the legal system is based on precedents that are binding in future 
decisions whereas in Romano-Germanic law the content of legal system stems from the 
norms of statutory, positive law.29 This fundamental difference between the common law 
and the Romano-Germanic law will be of importance for this thesis, both when describing 
the legal framework of the EU and the U.S. as well as in attempts to explicate the found 
differences and similarities.  
Intellectual property is a key resource for the EU and vital for its position in the global 
economy.30 Roughly 29 per cent of all jobs in the EU during 2014–2016 were generated by 
IPR-intensive industries and almost 45% of EU gross national product (GDP) was generated 
                                                 
25 See Patrignani (2017:65) for a discussion on how ’domestic’ and ’foreign’ can be relative terms in 
comparative law. 
26 In bilateral comparison two different legal systems are studied thoroughly (Husa, 2015:108). 
27 Michaels (2006) 69.  
28 Örücü (2006) 444–445. 
29 Husa (2015) 212–215. 
30 McMahon (2011) 1039. 
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in IPR-intensive industries.31 Likewise, IP plays an important role for the U.S. economy 
which has come to be known as a vocal advocate of strong IPR protection. When it comes 
to financial markets, the EU and the U.S. form jointly 71 % of the world’s capital market.32 
Against this background, the chosen fields of law, IP law and financial markets law, are of 
great importance to both of these legal systems which further makes selecting them for this 
comparative study a plausible choice. Furthermore, both IP and financial markets law are by 
nature fields of law that do not confound themselves strictly to intranational conditions but 
which have global reach. 
2.4 Limitations  
This type of comparative legal research covering broad tracks of substantive law is posed 
with the challenge of balancing breadth and depth. To address this, I will focus on patents, 
copyright, and trademarks, excluding the fourth major area of IP law, trade secrets. As 
covering all the major areas of IP law is beyond the scope of this study, I have decided to 
focus on the aforementioned three major areas of IP law to allow a more thorough analysis. 
I will, however, address international conventions on IP law such as the Bern and the Paris 
Convention and the TRIPS Agreement to the extent that describing them is necessary to 
comprehend the foundations of IP law of the EU and the United States. Secondly, in this 
study I will conduct a comparison of financial markets law in the EU and in the U.S. In the 
field of securities law, I will focus on what constitutes a security in both jurisdictions, 
prospectus regimes, and prohibition of insider trading. In banking regulation I will mostly 
focus on systemic regulation and to some extent conduct of business regulation while leaving 
micro prudential regulation and especially regulation of capital adequacy for another study.33  
                                                 
31 IPR-intensive industries are defined as industries with an above-average ownership of IPRs per employee, 
as compared to other IPR-using industries (European Patent Office (EPO) and European Union Intellectual 
Property Office (EUIPO), 2019:8–9). In this study it was found that between 2014–2016 of all the jobs in the 
EU 22 % were in trade mark-intensive industries, 14 % in design-intensive industries, 11 % in patent-
intensive industries, and lastly, 5,5 % in copyright-intensive industries. 
32 Stoltenberg et al. (2011) 580. This statistics stems from a pre Brexit time when the UK capital market still 
formed a part of the EU capital market. 
33 Systemic regulation refers to all public policy regulation under the financial safety net, in particular deposit 
insurance arrangements and the lender of last resort function, prudential regulation is focused on consumer 
protection through monitoring and supervising financial institutions with emphasis on asset quality and 
capital adequacy, and lastly, conduct of business regulation is concerned with how banks conduct their 
business (Casu, Girardone, and Molyneux, 2015:191). 
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2.5 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into five separate. In chapter 1 the topic of this research, IP and 
financial markets law in comparative context, is introduced. This is done in a fashion to 
demonstrate the added value of comparing two distinct yet connected fields of law. Chapter 
2 includes the research framework. The research framework entails first, the purpose of the 
study as well as the research questions with appropriate motivations. Secondly, comparative 
law as a research method deployed in the study is introduced. Thirdly, the territorial scope 
of the thesis with its rationale is introduced. Lastly, the limitations of the study are outlined. 
The limitations serve an important role in sharpening the focus of this study which might 
otherwise become too extensive due to the vast substantive law covered in this study. 
Chapter 2 in conjunction with chapter 1 then lays the groundwork for the rest of the study.  
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the chosen areas of IP law: patents, copyrights, and 
trademarks. After the general introduction into intellectual property rights, the legislative 
framework governing the chosen areas of IP law in the EU and the U.S. are reviewed in a 
subsequent order. Chapter 4 follows a similar order although the substantive law in focus is 
financial markets law. After a general overview of regulation of financial markets, the 
legislative framework for financial markets law, that is regulation on securities and banking, 
both in the EU and the U.S. is reviewed.  
Chapter 5 forms the core of this comparative study as it includes the actual comparison. 
Namely, in chapter 5 the detected differences and similarities regarding IP law and financial 
markets law are analyzed, with focus on the most interesting differences and similarities 
since accounting for all the differences or respectively similarities would go beyond the 
scope of this study. The identification of main differences is accompanied by attempts to 
explain the found divergence. After reviewing the differences regarding both IP law and the 
financial markets law, I will instead focus on similarities between the two jurisdictions in 
question. Similarly, attempts to explain the detected similarities in the EU and the U.S. in IP 
law and financial markets law are made. I conclude the study by highlighting the main 
findings and presenting suggestions for further research building on this study. 
Having made the structure of the study explicit, it is now time to turn to describing IP law 
and financial markets law both in the EU and in the U.S. This is a necessary phase to enable 
the study fulfill its main purposes, namely to compare legislation on IP and financial markets 
in the EU and the U.S. and perhaps even more importantly, attempts to draw conclusions 
about the found differences and similarities. 
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3. Intellectual Property Law in the EU and U.S. 
3.1. Overview of Intellectual Property Rights 
Intellectual property is, as the name gives indication to, useful information or knowledge 
created by intellectual endeavor.34 Although intellectual property is a created within each 
nation, international law, has established guidelines for uniform definition and protection as 
well means to ease the owners to acquire rights in different countries.35  
EU member states and the U.S. have ratified various international treaties affecting 
intellectual property laws. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works (the Berne Convention), administered by WIPO, protects literary and artistic works 
and it is the most influential international copyright convention.36 The U.S. joined the Berne 
Convention as late as at the end of 1980s, reasons for this delay will be discussed more in 
depth in the section on the history of IPR in the U.S. Whereas the Berne Convention covers 
copyright, the Paris Convention encompasses industrial property.37 Akin to many other 
major multilateral treaties concerning copyright, both the Berne and the Paris Convention 
are based on the principal of ‘national treatment’ that requires each member nation to treat 
national of other nations like their own for the purposes of copyright and industrial property 
rights.38 The Paris Convention is especially known for the principle of priority, which means 
that an applicant for a trademark can within six months of the initial filing, file a 
corresponding application in any other member state of the Convention and obtain the 
benefits of the first filing.39 
All the countries in the EU, and the U.S. are members of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), thus adhering to TRIPS (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights) that established a minimum level of protection of intellectual property 
rights.40 However, the TRIPS Agreement allows WTO member states to nationally 
determine implementation which leads to national variations.41 
                                                 
34 August, Mayer, and Bixby (2013) 490. 
35 ibid. 
36 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (as amended on September 28, 1979) 
[hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
37 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, March 20, 1888 July 14 (as revised at the 
Stockholm Revision Conference on July 14, 1967) [hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
38 Articles 5(1), 5(3), Berne Convention; Paris Convention, Article 2(1). 
39 See Article 4 (A) (I) of the Paris Convention. 
40 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Marrakesh, Morocco, 15 April 1994) 
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
41 Reichman (1997) 13–14. 
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Intellectual property is typically divided into two main branches: artistic property and 
industrial property.42 Artistic property includes artistic, literary, and musical works. The 
most common form of protection for artistic property are copyright and neighboring rights.43 
Of these I will only concentrate on copyright in this study. Copyrights refer to incorporeal 
statutory right that gives the author of an artistic work, for a limited period, the exclusive 
privilege of making copies of the work and publishing and selling the copies.44 Copyright 
faces a dual challenge by balancing between providing sufficient protection to authors and 
right holders as well as accommodating the needs of the information society and the public 
concerned with access to content.45  
Industrial property is in turn divided into two categories: invention and trademark.46 
Inventions encompass useful products as well as useful manufacturing processes.47 The 
primary method of protecting and rewarding inventors is through patents.48 A patent can be 
defined as an incorporeal statutory right that permits its owner, for a limited period, the 
exclusive right to use or sell a patented product or to use a patented method or process.49 
Most countries view that through patent protection for a limited time, innovation is 
encouraged which leads to benefits for the society as a whole.50 In a United Nations study 
comparing patent laws of the world, it was found that patent laws attempt to cater to two 
competing goals: the private rights of inventors in the form of claims for recognition and 
economic advantages as well as the public’s interest in promoting economic development 
and encouraging invention while allowing consumers to enjoy goods for fair value.51 Patents 
can be classified into three types: 1) utility or invention patents referring to both product and 
process patents, 2) utility model or design patents, and 3) plant variety patents.52  
Trademarks are perhaps the most omnipresent of the categories within the intellectual 
property. The traditional objective of trademarks was twofold: first, to protect producers 
from copycats who would deceive customers, and secondly, as a consequence of the first 
                                                 
42 August, Mayer, and Bixby (2013) 490. 
43 ibid. 
44 ibid. 
45 Stamatoudi and Torremans (2014) 1. 
46 August, Mayer, and Bixby (2013) 490. 
47 ibid. 
48 ibid 505. 
49 Bouchoux (2012) 5. 
50 Article 12, TRIPS Agreement. 
51 UN Doc. E/3861 (1964) 10. 
52 August, Mayer, and Bixby (2013) 506. 
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objective, the marketplace would be protected as well.53 Although there are specific 
universal norms regarding the recognition and protection of trademarks recognized both in 
the U.S. and within the EU, each system has its own nuances that need to be considered. 
Trademark include different kinds of markings such as ‘true’ trademarks, trade names, 
service marks, collective marks, and certification marks that indicate the ownership rights of 
manufacturers, merchants, and service establishment.54 In practical terms, all of these 
categories are labeled under the term trademark.55 
Although the details of legal regulation are a matter for national legislature, some 
fundamental features of protection for IPRs are to great extent, shared by all the EU member 
states and the U.S. and even the rest of the world.56  For patents, this universality entails that 
to be patentable, an invention needs to novel, inventive, and industrially applicable.57 To 
receive copyright protection, works need to have some degree of creativity or originality.58 
Trademarks in turn need to be sufficiently distinctive to identify and distinguish the 
commercial source of goods or services from another source.59 In addition to these 
commonly shared substantive requirements, patents and trademarks usually require 
registration whereas no registration is required for copyright.60  
3.2 Patent Law in the EU  
Patents count perhaps as the least harmonized area of intellectual property laws in the EU if 
measured in terms of EU directives and regulations.61 Currently there is no unitary patent 
system governing all the EU member states nor is there a unified patent court in Europe.62 
What is then understood as European patent law includes a fragmented legal system of 
national patents laws, conventions signed by European countries, and EU legislation and 
CJEU case law.63 
                                                 
53 Gerhardt (2010) 430. 
54 August, Mayer, and Bixby (2013) 490. 
55 ibid 512. 
56 Kur, Dreier, and Luginbuehl (2019) 3. 
57 ibid. 
58 ibid. 
59 ibid. 
60 The Berne Convention Article 5(2) even prohibits making copyright protection contingent on formalities. 
In the U.S. copyright can be acquired without registration but registration of copyright is required to enforce 
the author’s exclusive rights through litigation, see 17 U.S.C. (United States Code) § 408–412.  
61 Currently the only substantive EU legal instrument harmonizing EU patent law is the 98/44/EC Council 
Directive on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions [1998] OJ L 213/13 [hereinafter the Biotech 
Directive]. A second patent directive in the field of computer-related technology was proposed in 2002 but if 
was rejected by a majority of the European Parliament in 2005 (Pila and Torremans 2019:114). 
62 Pila and Torremans (2019) 118. 
63 ibid 117. 
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3.2.1 Obtaining Patents in Europe 
Obtaining a patent in Europe means either seeking the patent grant from a national patent 
office, through the centralized system of the European Patent Office (EPO) regulated by the 
supranational European Patent Convention (EPC) or through international route applying to 
WIPO, regulated by the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT).64 Regardless of the path chosen 
for filing a patent in Europe, the end result is one or more national patents with effects only 
within the territory of the granting state(s) and regulated by national law.65  
Only if and when the EU unitary patent system takes effect, will it be possible to obtain a 
single patent conferring equal and uniform protection throughout the territories of several 
EU member states.66 Kur, Dreier, and Luginbuehl have lamented that the objective of 
establishing an integrated market in the EU has been severely hindered by lack of a common 
patent for the territory of the EU.67 Similarly, Pila and Torremans have warned that failure 
to create a unitary patent system will leave the EU at a disadvantage compared to rivaling 
patent systems of Japan and the U.S.68 Efforts to create an EU unitary patent system have 
been taken as 26 EU member states signed the agreement to the Unitary Patent and Unified 
Patent Court system in 2012/2013, the so called ‘EU patent package’.69 Reviewing reasons 
for the delay in executing the EU patent package is beyond the scope of this study, but suffice 
to say that problems have arisen due to member states’ conflicting views on translation and 
judicial issues.70 This again reflects the extraordinary legal order of the EU with traces of 
federation and the challenges associated with creating a unified union comprising of various 
EU member states with their own political, economic, and national interests.71 
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69 Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 
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European patents are granted by article 52(1) of the EPC for any inventions that are novel, 
inventive, and susceptible of industrial application. An invention is considered new under 
article 54 of the EPC if the invention does not belong to ‘the state of the art’. Moreover, 
under article 56 of the EPC the invention needs to involve an inventive step, meaning that 
the invention is non-obvious to a person skilled in the art. 
3.2.2 Exceptions to Patentability 
Article 52(2) of the EPC excludes discoveries, scientific theories, mathematical methods, 
aesthetic creations, presentation of information, and computer programs. The term 
‘invention’ from article 52(1) is defined as a negation of these aforementioned categories.72 
Under EPO case law, exclusion on computer programs applies to the computer program 
listings which should be instead protected by copyright.73 Thus, a computer-implemented 
invention can be granted a patent only if it solves a technical problem in a novel and non-
obvious manner.74 
Article 53 of the EPC excludes a European patent from inventions whose commercial 
exploitation would be contrary to order public or morality.75 In addition to morality-based 
exclusions, inventions related to plant or animal varieties or essentially biological processes 
for the production of plants or animals also fall out of the scope of patentability under the 
EPC.76 Lastly, methods for treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy and 
diagnostic methods on human or animal body are not deemed patentable under the EPC.77 
3.2.3 CJEU Case Law: Brüstle and International Stem Cell Corporation 
Since the harmonization of EU patent law has been nearly non-existent, also the relevant 
cases have remained scarce. Both of the following cases relate to the Biotech Directive, the 
main European legal response to the burgeoning field of biotechnology. In Brüstle, the CJEU 
held that human embryos used for technological or commercial purposes are not deemed 
patentable, interpreting widely the concept of ‘human embryo’.78 In a later judgment 
International Stem Cell Corporation (ISCC) the CJEU ruled that the stimulated ovum 
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73 Pila and Torremans (2019) 157. 
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75 The exclusions of the article 53 of the EPC are similar to the exclusions found in article 27 of the TRIPS 
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76 Article 53(1) and 53(2) of the EPC. 
77 Article 53(3) of the EPC. 
78 See Case C-34/10 Oliver Brüstle v Greenpeace eV. [2011] ECR I-9821, ECLI:EU:C:2011:669, paragraph 
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without the ‘inherent capacity to develop into a human being’ is not considered a human 
embryo under the EU directive 98/44/EC.79 Minssen and Nordberg have argued that in ISCC 
the CJEU established a much needed limitation on the broad definition of human embryo 
established in Brüstle since the court held that unfertilized human eggs whose division and 
further development have been stimulated by parthenogenesis are patentable in Europe.80 
3.3 Patent Law in the U.S.  
After a brief peak into the history of IPR protection to contextualize modern-day U.S. patent 
law, current U.S. patent statutes as well as judicial opinions from U.S. courts will be 
reviewed with a focus on requirements of patentability and exclusions to patentability.  
3.3.1 Brief history of IPR protection in the U.S. 
The U.S. is known for serving as a central market for patents as well as an advocate of strong 
IPR protection.81 Legal protection of patents was adopted in the U.S. as early as in 1787 at 
the Constitutional Convention where a national patent system was created by granting the 
Congress the authority to legislate patents in Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution (the 
‘Patent clause’).82 The federal patent system was created a few years later in 1790 but it 
offered protection only for U.S. inventors.83 The Patent Act has since then, understandably, 
undergone several revisions and amendments although the current patent statute is 
surprisingly similar to its early versions.84  
Despite acting as a vocal advocate of patent and IPR protection, the U.S. has not always been 
a leading IPR advocate.85 Paradoxically, the U.S. is considered to have been the leading IPR 
violator during the 19th century by many historians studying this era.86 For instance, 
Americans copied secret British designs for looms and mills.87 Such violations of British 
IPR rights were backed by the U.S. government.88 Although pressure from the British to 
respect their IP rights certainly played a role, only when the pressure from the U.S. 
manufacturers and inventors to receive IPR protection abroad surmounted, did the 
                                                 
79 See Case C-364/13 International Stem Cell Corporation v. Comptroller General of Patents, Designs and 
Trade Marks [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2451, paragraph 38. 
80 Minssen and Nordberg (2015) 8. 
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82 Peng et al. (2017) 20. 
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85 Peng et al. (2017) 20. 
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widespread culture of copying change as IPR protection was extended to foreigners by the 
enactment of the International Copyright Act in 1891, the so called Chase Act.89 Why were 
such grave violations of foreign IPR, at least in today’s U.S. standards, not merely allowed 
but even endorsed by U.S. institutions? Scholars have argued that the U.S. refusal to protect 
foreign IPR before 1891 can be explained by low levels of literary and economic 
development in the U.S. which meant that protecting foreign IPR would have meant 
protection for foreign inventors, authors, and firms at a higher cost of goods for domestic 
consumers.90  
This brief excursion into the history of IPR exemplifies that understanding law in its 
historical context is vital if we are to comprehend IPR law more holistically and for the 
purposes of this study, to compare legal systems. 
3.3.2 Patentability  
The United States Code (U.S.C.) is a multivolume codification of published federal statutory 
law.91 Title 35 of the U.S.C. consists of 37 chapters and 376 sections and it governs all 
aspects of U.S. patent law. For an invention to be granted a patent in the U.S. it must meet 
the statutory requirements of title 35 of the U.S.C. These include falling within the patentable 
subject matter (section 101), utility (section 101), novelty (section 102), nonobviousness 
(section 103). However, both patent statutes and patent case law from federal court decisions 
need to be considered to create an accurate picture of U.S. patent law.92 
3.3.2.1 Patentable Subject Matter 
The U.S. patent law recognizes three types of patents: utility, design, and plant patents of 
which the utility patent is the most common form of patent and the focus of this overview.93 
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101 the subject matter of a utility patent covers processes, machines, 
manufactures, or a composition of matter. Courts have been challenged with determining 
whether a new invention qualifies as patentable subject matter or falls outside patent 
protection due to being only an abstract idea, natural phenomena, or a law of nature.94 Recent 
U.S. Supreme Court cases have dealt with the patentable subject matter, one of the five 
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necessary requirements for patentability. In Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc. the U.S. Supreme Court examined whether DNA and cDNA sequences are 
patentable subject matter.95 The Court stated that since naturally occurring DNA segments 
are products of nature, they are not eligible for a patent just because they have been isolated. 
On the other hand, in the same decision the Court ruled in favor of cDNA’s patent eligibility 
because it does not occur in nature. In Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International the Supreme 
Court examined patentable subject matter requirement for computer-implemented business 
method patent.96 Although the Court confirmed that an invention is not ineligible for patent 
only because it involves an abstract concept, the court also referred to a longstanding rule 
that an idea in and of itself is not patentable.97 Since the Court held that the petitioner’s claim 
at issue was directed to an abstract idea and did not add any substance to the underlying 
abstract idea, the Court held that the computer-implemented scheme was not eligible for a 
patent. 
3.3.2.2 Novelty   
Under the U.S. patent law, a person is entitled to a patent unless the claimed invention was 
patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale or otherwise available 
to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.98 Additionally, under 
25 U.S.C. § 102 (b) the inventor can be prevented from obtaining patent on an invention, if 
the inventor has disclosed the claimed invention for more than one year before the filing date 
of the patent application. A patent case relating to novelty includes Group One, Ltd. v. 
Hallmark Cards, Inc., where the Federal Circuit examined whether the communications 
between the patentee and a third part regarding the patented machine constitute an offer for 
sale.99 Such communication would remove the novelty of the patented inventions and thus, 
make the patent invalid under the law.100 The court held the patent to be invalid under 35 
U.S.C. § 102 (b) on the grounds that the invention had been on sale more than one year 
before the filing date of the application of the patent application. 
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Under the new America Invents Act (AIA) in 2013 the U.S. joined the rest of the 
international community by becoming a first-inventor-to-file-country.101 Prior to this, the 
patent priority was determined based on first to invent, not first to file the patent application, 
which set the U.S. apart from nearly all other countries.102  
3.3.2.3 Nonobviousness   
Apart from falling into the subject matter of patentability and utility, the claimed invention 
must be non-obvious to persons with ordinary skills in the art under 35 U.S.C. § 103. In 
determining whether the invention is obvious or not, the differences between the claimed 
invention and the prior art are to be considered in a manner that had the claimed invention 
as a whole been obvious before the patent filing date to a person with ordinary skill in the 
art.103 The concept of ‘common sense’ established has been central in evaluating 
obviousness.104 In Perfect Web Technologies, Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., the Federal Circuit 
addressed the question whether the invention related to methods of managing bulk e-mail 
distribution to groups of selected consumers could be considered as nonobvious and 
consequently, ineligible for patent protection under 35 U.S.C. § 103.105 The Court found the 
patent to be obvious since someone of ordinary skill could have arrived at the email 
distribution method in question.106 The Court employed the common sense criteria as well 
as the legal fiction of ordinary person with the skill in the art to evaluate obviousness as a 
criteria for patentability.  
3.4 Copyright Law in the EU  
The EU has issued legislature obligating its member states to harmonize their copyright 
regimes.107 These directives and the EU copyright law is built on the provisions of the Berne 
Convention to which all of the EU member states are signatories.108 The overall architecture 
of copyright law in the EU is thus a product of multinational efforts to unify the differing 
copyrights regimes of the EU member states. As with patents, no community-wide unitary 
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copyright exists, but instead the same copyrighted work receives protection according to 
different national laws of each EU member state.109  
3.4.1 Copyright Protection, Duration, and Registration 
Article 2 of the Berne Convention protects literary and artistic works. These works include, 
‘every production in the literary, scientific, and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode 
or form of its expression’.110 This definition encompasses works such as books, lectures, 
musical compositions, maps, plans, and painting, to name a few examples of protected works 
from the paragraph (1) of article 2.111 Also derivative works such as translations, and other 
alterations of literary or artistic work receive copyright protection under the Convention.112  
In recent years, the CJEU has taken an active role in furthering the harmonization of 
copyright at the EU level by judicial interpretation concerning a fundamental principle of 
copyright, the originality requirement.113 More specifically, in Infopaq and further in a series 
of subsequent cases the CJEU harmonized the general criterion of originality as an ‘author’s 
own intellectual creation’ for all works in EU copyright law.114 These rulings meant that the 
criterion of originality for copyright was not only restricted to computer programs, databases 
or photographs as originally intended by the Community legislature.115 These harmonization 
efforts of the CJEU serve as a prime example of judicial activism that the CJEU has engaged 
itself with throughout the years to further the integration of the EU. Some observers have 
argued that the CJEU has been inspired by the U.S. Supreme Court’s contributions to 
nationalizing American politics through gradually reducing key aspects of sovereignty of 
individual U.S. states.116  
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The Berne Convention does not require registration for an author to receive copyright 
protection for their work.117 When it comes to the duration of copyright protection, it is 
established as lasting 70 years after the author’s lifetime according to the EU Copyright 
Duration Directive aiming to harmonize the duration of copyrights in EU member states.118 
If the work has been created by multiple authors, the term of the protection spans to 70 years 
after the death of the last surviving author.119 
3.4.2 The Exclusive Rights and Moral Rights  
EU copyright law includes a host of exclusive or ’economic’ rights connected to copyrighted 
works of authors as well as neighboring rights of those who have particular relationships 
with such works. These exclusive and neighboring rights contain such rights as the rights of 
reproduction, distribution, and communication to the public as well as the right of rental and 
or/lending, broadcasting and computer program reproduction, distribution, and rental on 
behalf of authors.120  
In addition to economic rights, the copyright regimes of several EU member states recognize 
the French and continental concept of copyright (droit d´auteur), the natural rights 
perspective which protects the artistic reputation of the creator of a work by prohibiting 
others from modifying or distorting the work without the permission of the author even if 
the copyright has been transferred to another person or persons.121 The moral rights can be 
separated into four distinct categories; first, the right of integrity, under which the author can 
prohibit alterations of the work.122 Secondly, the right of attribution/paternity means that the 
author can condition the distribution of the work on his/her name being associated with the 
work, and thirdly, the right of disclosure, under which the artist can prevent the publication 
of the work until it meets the artist’s own requirement.123 Lastly, moral rights includes the 
right of retraction/withdrawal under which, as the name suggests, the artist retains the right 
to withdraw the work.124  
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Individual EU member states can determine whether they recognize moral rights and if so, 
to what extent.125 Since the extent of moral rights in different EU member states varies with 
countries such as France and Germany offering extensive protection of moral rights and in 
turn Nordic countries offering only minimum requirement imposed by the Berne 
Convention, some legal scholars have called for a minimum harmonization of moral rights 
at the EU level.126 Others have predicted harmonization to be a challenging task on the 
grounds that the moral rights theories underpinning copyright regimes in EU countries are 
internally inconsistent.127 Other reasons to doubt the need for copyright harmonization at the 
EU level include the argument that moral rights, and in particular, the right of integrity can 
be misused as an abusive power by the artist over their work.128 Interestingly, Dietz has 
suggested that the fair use provision codified in article 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act could 
be used as a model in harmonizing the right of integrity at the EU level.129 All in all, it can 
be concluded that the debate on copyright harmonization in the EU is a controversial issue 
with valid arguments on both sides for and against harmonization of moral rights.  
3.4.3 Restrictions on Copyright Protection 
Under EU copyright law, the first sale of the original or a copy of a work by the author or 
with his/her consent exhausts the right ‘to control the resale of that object’.130 In addition to 
this exhaustion principle developed by the CJEU in Deutsche Grammophon and later 
codified in Article 4 (2) of the InfoSoc Directive, EU copyright law includes other central 
limitations on copyright.131 Although there is no ‘fair use’ doctrine akin to the U.S. copyright 
doctrine, EU copyright law sets specific limitations upon the copyright’s exclusive rights by 
allowing unauthorized use of copyrighted works in the public interest to advance science, 
education, and culture listed in article 5 of the InfoSoc Directive.132 Examples of these 
limitations on copyright include among others uses as reproduction for private and non-
commercial use, use for illustration for teaching or academic research, and press reviews and 
news reporting.133  
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Despite substantially harmonizing EU copyright law, 20 of the 21 exceptions listed in the 
InfoSoc Directive are optional since member states were not willing to abandon existing 
exceptions in their own national laws, meaning that exceptions in Article 5 are to great extent 
a collection of exceptions found in national copyright legislation of EU member states.134 
This example as well as impediments with harmonizing moral rights can be seen to illustrate 
a more general tension in the EU between reconciling the aim of creating a unified, strong 
common internal market with piecemeal harmonization of copyright legislation and aligning 
the national interests of individual member states. I will return to this theme in my analysis 
of the reasons underlying the differences between EU and U.S. copyright law. 
3.5 Copyright Law in the U.S.  
The authority of the Congress in the U.S. to adopt a copyright law is provided by the U.S. 
Constitution, Article I, Section 8.135 The English mechanism of granting authors exclusive 
property rights was adopted in the U.S. Constitution.136 The first copyright statute was 
enacted by the Congress in 1790 and akin to the first patent statute, it did not extend 
protection for works by foreigners explicitly excluding foreigners from the coverage of the 
statute.137 Since the function of the U.S. copyright is to promote progress of literary and 
artistic endeavor adhering to the rationale for Anglo-American copyright tradition as 
utilitarian with emphasis on economic rights, the author’s natural rights tradition was not 
included in U.S. copyright at its inception.138  
For a long time it was the assumed that the main reason for the U.S. not to become a signatory 
to the Berne Convention was the requirement of the treaty to recognize moral rights.139 
However, in 1989 the U.S. finally ratified the Berne Convention that requires its signatory 
states to impose minimal formalities and protection to both economic and moral rights.140 
When ratifying the Berne Convention, the U.S. Congress was hesitant to accept the moral 
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rights portion with the argument that its current state and federal law sufficiently satisfy 
Article 6bis of the Berne Convention.141 
U.S. courts and legal writers have been of the opinion that moral rights do not exist in the 
U.S.142 Jaszi, a U.S. legal scholar specialized in copyright law, has criticized author’s natural 
rights tradition in the U.S. copyright doctrine labeling this view as ‘romantic authorship’, 
outdated pre-industrial tradition with overblown emphasis on the individual, incongruent 
with the demands of the modern marketplace.143 He raised this criticism shortly after the 
U.S. ratified the Berne Convention ending the American isolationism.144 Although Jaszi’s 
criticism of the U.S. construct of authorship is well grounded, it overlooks important insights 
from the field of psychology and more precisely, from the self-determination theory. In 
short, according to the self-determination theory, experimental studies show that humans are 
not merely motivated by external rewards such as money or prestige but also by internal 
forces such as a feelings of accomplishments.145 In the domain of copyright which is by 
definition about creative work, the intrinsic motivational forces can be expected to influence 
the creators which would support the view of the natural rights tradition. The main argument 
here is then that to propose that creators of creative work protected by copyright are not also 
or even heavily motivated by economics gains would be naïve but to reduce their work 
merely to serving an economic purpose overlooks other central motivational factors at play. 
3.5.1 The Requirements for Copyright Protection 
The broad reach of U.S. copyright law extends to all works that are 1) original, 2) work of 
authorship, and 3) fixed in a tangible form of expression.146 Although copyright protection 
has traditionally been associated with artistic endeavor, the requirement of originality should 
not be confused with novelty or aesthetic appeal.147 Rather, originality entails that the 
material should be an independent product of the author rather than a copy or variation of an 
existing work.148 The creativity component can be achieved by virtually any endeavor 
characterized by expressiveness.149 Yet some creative spark is still required since the U.S. 
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Supreme Court held in Feist that telephone white page listings did not qualify for copyright 
protection for lacking minimal creativity.150  
The U.S.C. 17 § 102 (a) lists eight categories of works deemed as ‘works of authorship’.151 
The list is not, however, to be understood as exhaustive but rather as illustrative, because 
additional kinds of creative works can also be eligible for copyright protection.152 The 
Copyright Act offers protection for works of authorship that are ‘fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression’.153 A work is ‘fixed’ if it is embodied in a copy or phonorecord and 
is sufficiently permanent or stable to be perceived, or communicated for a period of more 
than transitory nature.154 Examples of copies include famous photographs printed on T-shirt 
or coffee mug and a record or a CD recording of a song by Beatles counts as examples of 
phonorecords.155  
3.5.2 Exclusions to Copyright Protection 
Under Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act, copyright protection does not extend to 
procedures, processes, systems, methods of operation, concepts, principles, and discoveries. 
Under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) an author’s individual expression is protected but the protection 
does not cover the underlying idea of facts, which is commonly referred as the 
‘idea/expression’ dichotomy.156 According to this doctrine, the storyline of an underdog 
presented with a sudden challenge and eventually through twists and turns becoming a hero 
against all odds as depicted in many motion pictures such as Rocky and the Lord of the Rings 
is not protected under U.S. copyright law. However, copyright protects these artistic works 
as such.157  
The idea/expression dichotomy is further extended by two related copyright doctrines: the 
doctrine of merger and scenes a faire.158 When an author’s expression of an idea is closely 
integrated with the idea embodied in the work, it might not be possible to distinguish between 
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them.159 On the other hand, also the number of ways to express an idea can be very limited.160 
In both situations, the idea and how it is expressed can be considered to have merged and to 
have become indivisible, hence the name doctrine of merger.161 When an expression has 
become standard and is therefore commonly found in works of that genre, it falls under the 
scenes a faire doctrine as unprotectable.162  
3.5.3 The Exclusive Rights and Restrictions on Copyright Protection 
Reproduction, distribution, preparation of derivative works, public performance and public 
displays are recognized under the U.S. copyright law as exclusive rights.163 The exclusive 
right to prepare derivative works precludes others from using a copyrighted work or portions 
of it to create new works. An example of infringement of this exclusive right would be using 
copyrighted characters such as Mickey Mouse to produce a sequel.164 The exclusive right of 
public performance applies to literary, musical, dramatic, choreographic works, motion 
pictures, and other audiovisual works.165 The exclusive right of public display is applicable 
to paintings, sculptures, and similar works.166 Also software programs as a literary work 
enjoy the pertinent exclusive rights.167 
The guiding purpose of the U.S. copyright law is to foster the creation and dissemination of 
literary and artistic works to allow the public to access knowledge.168 Balancing the primary 
and secondary aims of the U.S. copyright law requires striking a balance between the 
author’s exclusive rights and public’s rights and privileges. The most central doctrine 
connected to public engagement is the fair use doctrine in 17 U.S.C. § 107. For activities 
such as news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research use of copyrighted material can 
be allowed under the fair use doctrine without the copyright holder’s consent.169 To 
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determine whether a given activity classifies as a fair use, Section 107 includes a four factor 
test.170  
Starting from the 1980s, the U.S. courts have allowed unauthorized digital uses of 
copyrighted material under the fair use doctrine.171 The fair use has been interpreted by U.S. 
courts to cover such wide uses as unauthorized copying of a software program for studying 
its structure and to design new programs172, unauthorized copyright with the intention of 
extracting unprotected material173, and replicating copyrighted images online as 
‘thumbnails’ for search engine indexing.174 Digitally scanning books in a host of university 
libraries to improve public access to scholarly research and archival preservation of books 
as part of The Google Books Project was also deemed as Fair Use.175 The variety of 
permitted uses of copyright protected works exemplifies the flexibility of the Fair Use 
doctrine that the U.S. courts have made full use of.176  
In addition to the fair use doctrine, another doctrine limiting the author’s exclusive rights is 
the first sale doctrine.177 Under this doctrine, after a ‘first sale’ by the author, the particular 
copy of the copyrighted work can be re-distributed without the consent of the copyright 
holder.178 In addition to the fair use and first sale doctrine, a host of compulsory licenses also 
limit the author’s exclusive rights.179 
3.5.4 Copyright Duration and Registration  
Copyright protection in the U.S. lasts as a general rule 70 after the death of the author.180 In 
cases of work for hire, copyright duration is 95 years from the date of publication or 120 
years from the date of creation depending on which expires first.181 Although registration is 
not a requirement for obtaining a copyright, registration is nevertheless required from the 
author with the Copyright Office to document the copyright which is needed to enforce an 
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author’s exclusive rights through litigation.182 Registration entitles the author a legal 
presumption that her work contains protectable copyright subject matter as well as acts as a 
prerequisite to obtaining an award of statutory as opposed to actual damages.183 
3.6 Trademark Law in the EU  
Fundamental for understanding the trademark law of the EU are the Trade Mark Directive 
(TMD) and the Community trade mark regulation, renamed as European Union Trade Mark 
Regulation (EUTMR).184 The administration of the community trademark system rests in 
the authority of the Office for Harmonization, now known as the European Union 
Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).185 Whereas the TMD merely obligates member states 
to align their national copyright laws with the provisions of the directive, the EUTMR forms 
a unitary right extending the whole union.186 However, the existence of the Community 
Trade mark system does not replace national trademarks, since both national and union wide 
trademark systems were meant to coexist.187 
3.6.1 Registration, Subject Matter, and Grounds for Refusal 
Both the TMD and the EUTMR are based on the premise that trademarks are obtained by 
registration.188 Nevertheless, the Trademark Directive allows member states to continue to 
protect trademarks acquired through use by setting their own standards regarding the 
protection of such trademarks.189 Registration as a point of departure for trademark 
protection in the EU differs from the U.S., which will be dealt more in depth later in the 
section on explaining the differences of trademark law in the EU and the U.S. 
Definitions on trademark subject matter found in Article 4 of the EUTMR and Article 3 of 
the TMD are identical; in both protectable subject matter is extended to signs capable of 
distinguishing commercial origin and mode of representation. The criteria of capability to 
distinguish commercial origin for a sign is to be understood broadly so that the exemplary 
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list in Article 4 of the EUTMR with references to signs such as personal names, letters, 
colors, and sounds is not meant as exhaustive.190 Distinctiveness is to be viewed from the 
point of view of relevant public, which is to be seen as reasonably well informed and 
reasonably observant and circumspect with varying levels of attention depending on the 
importance and value of the transaction.191 In addition to distinctiveness in trade, trade mark 
is described broadly as any sign.192 However, signs are not eligible for protection if they are 
broad and vague concepts as opposed to specific signs, decided in Dyson.193  
The second requirement for protection entails mode of representation, which replaced the 
earlier requirement of graphical representability by the law reform in 2015.194 In Sieckmann 
the CJEU presented seven criteria for graphical representation: clear, precise, self-contained, 
easily accessible, intelligible, durable, and objective.195 In regards to graphical 
representability concerning non-traditional signs, the CJEU has ruled that colors per se do 
not constitute a trademark unless they are recognized by an internationally recognized 
identification code196, color combinations must be systematically arranged by associating 
the colors in question in a predetermined and uniform way197, and musical tunes can receive 
protection if the sign is represented by a stave divided into measures.198 The Sieckmann test 
to evaluate whether a sign fulfills the requirement of being represented graphically to qualify 
for trademark protection still holds although other means than graphical representation may 
be employed.199 
Absolute grounds for refusal are established in an extensive list of provisions found in 
Article 7 of the EUTMR and respectively, in Article 4 of the TMD. Trademarks need to 
fulfill the criteria of distinctive and descriptive character that have become customary in the 
current language or in the bona fide of the established practices of the trade and these criteria 
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are to be assessed separately.200 In Doublemint, a landmark case concerning distinctive 
character of trademarks consisting of common words, the CJEU held that a sign cannot be 
registered if as least one of its possible meanings describes a characteristic of the goods or 
services in question.201 Some marks can become distinctive through use and this assessment 
by court can include factors such as market share held by the mark, how widespread the 
mark is geographically, duration of the its use, as well as considerations on how a relevant 
class of persons perceives the goods or services as originating from a particular source.202 
The underlying objective with the distinctiveness requirement focuses on the interests of 
consumers to identify the products they want to buy, whereas the descriptive character caters 
to the interest of competitors to ensure free competition as to keep a sign available for general 
use.203 The principles relating to absolute unregistrability follow directly from the Paris 
Convention.204 This in turn reflects the international convergence of IP field, an important 
explanatory factor for similarity of IP laws of the EU and the U.S.  
In addition to absolute grounds for refusal, relative grounds for refusal of registration found 
in article 5 of the TMD and article 8 of the EUTMR are included in EU’s comprehensive 
examination process. The TMD and the EUTMR offer a three-tier system of protection.205 
First it has to be evaluated whether the trademark concerned is in fact an ‘earlier trade mark’, 
a trademark registered through the provisions of the Madrid Protocol or well-known trade 
mark for the purposes of the Paris Convention and thus unregistrable mark.206 Secondly, 
trademark is unregistrable if it is either identical to an earlier mark and to be used on similar 
goods and services or similar to an earlier mark and to be used on identical or similar goods 
or services.207 Thirdly, prior similar or identical use of a mark prevents registration even if 
goods or services are dissimilar if the earlier mark has gained a reputation and the subsequent 
use of the same mark in a different context would mean taking unfair advantage of the earlier 
mark’s reputation.208 
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3.6.2 Trademark Protection and Limitations  
The proprietor of a community trade mark enjoys exclusive rights to the trademark and right 
to bring actions for infringement of the mark from the date of publication of registration of 
the trademark.209 A trademark becomes an item of personal property that proprietors of 
trademarks can to a great extent deal unrestricted by assignment or licensing.210 
Articles 14 (1) EUTMR and Article 14 (1) TMD allow for certain actions by third parties in 
the course trade even if the use involves a protected sign. Trademark rights can be limited 
by honest uses by third parties if the use is in accordance with honest practices in industrial 
or commercial matters.211 Limitations include use of one’s own name or address, use of non-
distinctive signs or descriptive indications and referential use.212 The exhaustion principle 
and more specifically, regional exhaustion is another major limitation on the trademark 
rights.213 A community trademark will not entitle the proprietor to prohibit the use of the 
trademark in relation to goods that have been actually sold or the ownership has otherwise 
been transferred in the EU market by the proprietor or with their implied consent.214 The 
proprietor can oppose further commercialization of goods only if the proprietor has 
legitimate reasons to suspect that the goods are changed or impaired after they have been put 
to the market.215 This exhaustion principle in the EU is similar although not identical to the 
exhaustion principle of the U.S. trademark law.  
The likelihood of confusion forms a fundamental precept in protecting trademarks from 
infringement based on the TMD, the EUTMR and case-law of the CJEU.216 The CJEU has 
decided three foundational cases that form the standards for assessing likelihood of 
confusion.217 First, in Sabél v Puma the CJEU held that the likelihood of confusion must be 
assessed globally appreciating visual, aural or conceptual similarity of the marks in questions 
paying special attention to distinctive and dominant components and taking into account that 
the more distinctive the earlier mark is, the greater the likelihood of confusion.218 Secondly, 
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in Canon v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. the CJEU established that in addition to similarity 
between the sign and the mark, similarity of goods and services for which the signs are must 
be considered in the assessment of likelihood of confusion.219 Lastly, in Meyer v Klijsen the 
CJEU held that the concept of the average circumspect consumer applies in EU trademark 
law and that the category of goods and services may affect the average consumer’s level of 
attention.220 The EU test for likelihood of confusion is currently in force in all member states 
regarding both national trademark and Community trademark.  
3.7 Trademark Law in the U.S.  
The Lanham Act of 1946 is a federal statute that broadly regulates the use, registration, and 
protection of trademarks.221 The purpose of federal registration of trademarks is to limit 
territorial fragmentation and concurrent rights.222 The Lanham Act codified earlier common 
law consisting of foundational concepts of trademark law developed by courts.223 This 
exemplifies the central role of courts and precedents in a common law system where the 
amount of statues can indeed be equal to that of a legislation-centered civil law system but 
where even codified positive law often stems from common law.224 
Traditionally, drawing on the natural rights theory of property the purpose of the trademark 
law in the U.S. was to protect producers from unfair competition by their competitors so that 
any consumers’ interests were only secondary.225 More recently, U.S. trademark law has 
expanded its purpose to protect consumers and improve quality of information by reducing 
search costs.226 The modern trademark law in the U.S. can be characterized as placing a 
heavy focus on protecting brand value.227 
3.7.1 Distinctiveness  
Trademark law in the U.S. protects anything that can carry a meaning indicating a source if 
the mark falls on ‘spectrum of distinctiveness’.228 Distinctiveness means the extent to which 
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a claimed designation conveys information to consumers about the source of products or 
services instead of merely passing on information related to the product.229 This spectrum of 
distinctiveness, ranging from the least to most distinctive: generic, descriptive, suggestive, 
arbitrary or fanciful, determines whether the trademark can receive protection.230 Generic 
marks are never eligible for protection since they fail to indicate a particular source but 
instead refer to a general name of a product or a service, such as ‘computer’.231 Descriptive 
marks are assumed not to be distinctive but they can become protectable over time if their 
primary meaning has an acquired a secondary meaning through use, sales, and promotion of 
the mark.232 Marks that fall under the last three categories, namely suggestive, arbitrary or 
fanciful are considered to be inherently distinctive and protectable based on the assumption 
that consumers will perceive them as distinctive.233  
3.7.2 Trade Dress, Dilution, and Geographic Indications 
Also trade dress, dilution, and geographic indications fall within the scope of the U.S. 
trademark law. Trade dress is usually defined as the total image of a product and such 
features as size, shape, color, color combinations, texture or graphics may be included.234 
Trade dress is eligible for protection if it is nonfunctional, has acquired secondary meaning, 
and its imitation creates a possibility of consumer confusion.235 Nonfunctionality is assessed 
by determining whether the product feature is not a prerequisite for the product’s use and 
does not have an effect on the cost or quality of the product.236 Secondary meaning depends 
on whether the purchasing public links the dress with a single producer or source instead of 
merely the product itself.237 The test of likelihood of confusion evaluates the total effect of 
the defendant’s product and package on the eye and the mind of a normal purchaser.238 In 
case law, two types of trade dress have been established: product packaging and product 
design.239 
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Trademark subject matter has been expanded to cover nontraditional trademarks in case 
law.240 Nontraditional indicators of source such as sound, color, scent, taste, and tactile 
marks as well as holographic marks and motion of a product can count as valid trademark in 
the U.S. when they are or become distinctive of the good or service in the minds of the 
consumers and can be represented graphically.241 
The Lanham Act was amended with the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 which in 
turn has been to great extent replaced by Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (TDRA). 
The Lanham Act protects only famous marks including a nonexclusive list of eight factors 
by which the courts can evaluate whether a mark can be considered to be ‘distinctive and 
famous’.242 American legal scholar Lemley has criticized U.S. courts for overextending the 
protection from dilution to locally well-known but nationally obscure trademarks.243 Owner 
of a famous mark that is distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, is entitled 
to an injunction against somebody who uses the mark in commerce likely leading to either 
dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark.244 Dilution by blurring 
refers to a situation where a mark previously linked with one product also becomes linked 
to a second product.245 Blurring decreases consumers’ ability to link the original association 
of the mark.246 Tarnishment is linking the trademark to product of questionable quality or 
portraying it in an unwholesome or unsavory context resulting in the plaintiff’s unrelated 
good to be viewed by the public to be associated with the defendant’s goods lacking quality 
or prestige.247 For instance, linking a famous mark with pornography or illegal activity would 
count as tarnishment.248  
In addition to trade dress and dilution, geographic indications (GIs) are also protected under 
the Lanham Act.249 Certification or collective marks which identify place of manufacture, 
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quality, and producer groups receive protection under the Lanham Act.250 Although the U.S. 
is a signatory to the TRIPS Agreement, Silva has lamented the failure of the U.S. to bring 
its domestic legislation in conformity with the mandates of the TRIPS Agreement regarding 
the quintessential example of a product relying on a GI, namely wine.251  
3.7.3 Trademark Protection and Its Limits 
The system of trademark recognition and protection in the U.S. is dualistic so that each state 
has its own system of trademark registration alongside the federal registration.252 Another 
distinct feature of trademark recognition and protection in the U.S. is common law 
unregistered trademark which means that federal registration is not a prerequisite for the use 
of the trademark nor establishing common law rights in a mark.253 Consequently, registered 
and unregistered trademarks receive almost equal protection.254 In light of this, a U.S. 
company could use their trademarks for an extensive period before registering their 
trademarks.   
Trademark owners enjoy the exclusive use of their trademarks which means protection from 
use by another if such use would run the risk of causing confusion.255 However, the U.S. 
trademark law contains some important restrictions on the rights of a trademark holder. First, 
the doctrine of functionality limits the rights of a trademark holder.256 Functional product 
features, regardless if they signify a source, are not eligible for trademark protection.257 A 
feature of a trademark of trade dress counts as functional if it is essential to the use or purpose 
of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.258 Second, common law 
trademarks receive trademark protection only in the geographic areas where the trademarked 
products are sold or advertised.259 Third, descriptive fair use and nominative fair use limit 
trademark protection.260 Under the nominative fair use doctrine it is allowed to make 
                                                 
250 15 U.S.C. § 1054. 
251 Silva (2005) 197. 
252 Bouchoux (2012) 26. 
253 ibid 22. 
254 McKenna (2008) 846. 
255 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). 
256 McKenna (2008) 848. 
257 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5), 1125(a)(3). 
258 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 S.Ct. 159 (1995) in which the Supreme Court reasoned 
that the purpose of functionality doctrine is to balance trademark law and patent law. Since a monopoly over 
new product design or functions are in the province of patent law, allowing a trademark on grounds of 
functional features would in practice mean a monopoly without a time limit. 
259 Bouchoux (2012) 23. 
260 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4).  
35 
 
reference to another trademark in comparing his or her product to that of the competitor.261 
In the absence of the fair use doctrine, protecting trademarks would significantly limit free 
speech, a fundamental principle of the U.S. legal system. Fourth, once products have been 
introduced to the market, a trademark holder cannot rely on trademark rights to control the 
distribution of trademarked goods beyond the first sale, also known as the exhaustion rule.262 
An important exception to the exhaustion rule is that trademark rights are not considered to 
be exhausted when third parties have tampered with the quality of marked products without 
the trademark holder consenting to the alteration after the first sale.263 
3.8. Concluding Remarks 
Since linguistics plays a pivotal role in comparative law, I will give an example arising from 
the material covered in this section. The terminology in reference to widely known 
trademarks eligible for protection from dilution in the EU is a trademark that ‘has a 
reputation in the member state’ whereas U.S. law speaks of ‘famous marks’.264 In 
international legislation the preferred term for trademarks exempted from registration as well 
as whose protection is extended to dissimilar goods or services is in turn ‘well-known 
marks’.265 Although such differences in preferred terminology regarding famous trademarks 
can seem superficial, recognizing their existence is necessary for understanding trademarks 
in the EU and in the U.S. respectively, and even in international legislation as the example 
indicates divergences in all the three arenas. 
4. Financial Markets Law in the EU and U.S. 
4.1. Overview of Regulation of Financial Markets  
Before comparing financial markets law in the EU and the U.S., it is reasonable to give a 
general overview of financial markets. The purpose of financial markets is to raise capital 
and more specifically, to match those that are in need of capital, borrowers, with those 
willing to lend, lenders.266 This matching takes places through financial intermediaries such 
as banks who take deposits from those that want to save, from ‘surplus units’ and bundle up 
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the money in a way that it can be further lent to borrowers, ‘units in deficit’.267 Apart from 
simple bank deposits, money can be raised through stock exchanges where companies sell 
shares to investors for the first time on the primary market. When shares are offered on the 
primary market, the issuer has a legal obligation to prepare and register a prospectus, a 
disclosure document that contains information regarding the financial safety of the 
investment to potential buyers.268 Existing shares can be bought and sold freely on the 
secondary market.269 Shares fall into the larger category of securities and they share some 
basic features: how much is owed, when the payment is due, and rate of interest to be paid 
to the lender.270  
Whereas securities law regulates issuance of securities in the primary and secondary 
markets, banking law, in turn, concentrates on regulating the intermediaries of financial 
transactions to which banks belong to. Financial intermediation benefits the society as a 
whole since it enables more efficient utilization of funds within an economy, causes a higher 
level of borrowing and lending by reducing costs and risk associated with these activities, 
and contributes to more available funds for high-risk ventures with a capability of absorbing 
the higher risk.271 Despite these benefits with banks, banking is the most regulated 
industry.272 Banks can cause great distress in the society and due to their interconnectedness, 
a failure of one institution can immediately negatively affects others, causing bank 
contagion.273 Bank contagion can lead to bank runs where the loss of depositors trust in the 
bank causes them to withdraw their savings at the same time, causing the bank to become 
insolvent.274 The rationale of banking regulation is thus to ensure consumer confidence in 
the financial sector by ensuring systemic stability, providing retail customers with 
protection, and to protect consumers against monopolistic exploitation.275 
Banking regulation can be divided into three different types: systemic (macro-prudential) 
regulation, prudential (macro-prudential) regulation, and conduct of business regulation.276 
Without going into too much details, systemic regulation refers to all public policy regulation 
under the financial safety net, in particular deposit insurance arrangements and the lender of 
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last resort function, one of the main functions of a central bank.277 Prudential regulation is 
focused on consumer protection through monitoring and supervising financial institutions 
with emphasis on asset quality and capital adequacy.278 Conduct of business regulation is 
concerned with how banks conduct their business, so this type of regulation touches upon 
issues such as information disclosure, fair business practices, competence, and honesty and 
integrity of banks.279 Of these three types of regulation I will mainly focus on comparing 
systemic regulation and financial safety nets in the EU and the U.S. as well as give some 
attention to conduct of business regulation. I will, however, focus less on prudential 
regulation and capital adequacy to sharpen the focus of the comparison. 
4.2 Securities Law in the EU  
Creating a single internal market by removing barriers to the free movement of goods, 
persons, services, and capital between EU member states is the hallmark of EU law.280 
Integrating financial markets in the EU began in the 1980s with attempts to harmonize the 
rules of member states.281 When this approach failed, in the 1990s EU legislators turned 
instead to harmonization of essential standards to pave the way for mutual recognition of 
home country rules in the area of securities and banking transactions to achieve the goal of 
the free flow of capital.282 Mutual recognition entails that a financial institution authorized 
in one EU member state can conduct business in any other EU state without additional 
authorization.283 A natural consequence of mutual recognition is the principle of home 
country control under which countries hosting a branch of another member state’s financial 
institution need to accept the institution’s home country rules and supervisory practices as 
controlling the bank branch operations and cross-border provisions of services.284 More 
recently in 2015, the European Commission has sought to increase investment in EU 
member states by creating a truly EU-wide single capital market through an initiative called 
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the capital markets union (CMU).285 Some commentators have suggested that since London, 
Europe’s financial center, no longer belongs to the EU securities market due to Brexit, the 
viability of the CMU can be seriously questioned.286 On a more positive note, Rosas and 
Armati have suggested that Brexit is unlikely to hinder the integration of the EU.287 On the 
contrary, they argue that amending EU primary and secondary law might be easier in a post-
Brexit Union given the opposition of the UK to commit to deeper European integration.288 
EU securities law has evolved significantly throughout the years and it currently comprises 
of a host of directives and regulations. Regulations have become the preferred legislative 
instrument of the Commission in recent years as opposed to directives in order to forego 
issues with national implementation and to increase integration of the securities markets in 
the EU.289 I will focus here on some of the most central aspects of the EU securities 
regulatory framework, namely what constitutes a security under the EU securities regulation, 
the prospectus regime, and regulation on market abuse and insider dealing.   
4.2.1 Defining Securities under EU Securities Law 
EU financial legislation assigns substantial value to determining whether an instrument 
qualifies as a security, referred to as ‘transferable security’ in EU securities legislation.290 
The main definition of securities under EU securities law can be found in Article 4(1)(44) 
of MiFID II, under which shares, bonds or options or similar financial instruments are 
‘transferable securities’.291 To qualify as a security within the meaning of uniform definition 
under EU securities regulation, the instrument has to meet three formal statutory 
requirements of transferability, standardization, and negotiability.292 Securities are 
considered transferable when they do not contain obstacles that make their transfer 
impossible.293 Securities are negotiable on the capital market which has the implication that 
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they are standardized instruments.294 Negotiability is not a legal requirement in the same 
manner as transferability but instead it indicates the ease of exchange as a matter of fact.295 
Although the statutory definition of a security under EU securities law is seemingly 
unambitious, new financial innovations such as initial coin offerings (ICOs), online-
mediated offerings where tokens registered on a blockchain are offered in exchange for 
cryptocoins, have caused many legal scholars to question the limits of a security under 
current EU securities law.296 As of this writing, the CJEU has not given any decision 
regarding the definition of a security although such clarification might be warranted given 
the recent technological advancements in financial markets.297  
4.2.2 The Prospectus Regime in the EU 
To increase cross-border securities activity in the EU, the Prospectus Directive was adopted 
in 2003.298 It has since been amended in 2010 and was replaced by the new Prospectus 
Regulation in 2019 as a keystone in furthering the implementation of the CMU.299 The 
Prospectus Regulation has three key objectives: first, it aims to ease the administrative 
burden in connection with issuance of securities, especially for small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs).300 Secondly, it aims to increase the relevance of the prospectus as an 
information disclosure tool to potential investors, and lastly, it strives to align the prospectus 
disclosure requirements and other EU disclosure rules.301 Because the Prospectus Regulation 
is, as its name suggests, a regulation, it is directly applicable in all the member states, 
                                                 
294 Ferrarini and Giudici (2020) 132. 
295 Hacker and Thomale (2018) 645. 
296 See Maume and Fromberger (2019) for a comparative analysis of the regulation on ICOs in the EU and 
the U.S and Hacker and Thomale (2018) for an analysis of the applicability of EU securities regulation to 
ICOs. 
297 Maume and Fromberger (2019) 573–574. 
298 Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the 
prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated 
market [2003] OJ L 345/64, amended by Directive 2010/73/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 24 November 2010 amending Directives 2003/71/EC on the prospectus to be published when 
securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and 2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of 
transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on 
a regulated market [2010] OJ L 327/1. 
299 Council Regulation (EU) 1129/2017 on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the 
public or admitted to trading on a regulated market [2017] OJ L 168/12 [hereinafter the Prospectus 
Regulation]. 
300 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated 
market, COM [2015] 583 final (European Commission, Final Proposal for a Regulation on the Prospectus). 
301 ibid. 
40 
 
reducing legislative inconsistencies and aiming at uniform application of rules in different 
member states.302  
Three central concepts limit the subject matter and scope of the Prospectus Regulation: 
securities, offer to the public, and regulated market.303 Since I have already reviewed key 
elements of a security under EU securities regulation, I will now review the two remaining 
concepts. The legal obligation to publish a prospectus under the Prospectus Regulation is 
triggered in two instances: when securities are offered to the public and/or when securities 
are admitted to trading on a regulated market.304 The two triggers can also coexist, as in an 
initial public offering (IPO), where shares are both offered to the public and allowed for 
future trading via a regulated market.305 The first trigger, ‘an offer of securities to the public’ 
is defined under Article (2)(d) of the Prospectus Regulation as ‘a communication to persons 
in any form and by any means, presenting sufficient information on the terms of the offer 
and the securities to be offered, so as to enable an investor to decide to purchase or subscribe 
for those securities’. This definition excludes marketing material meant to test the interest of 
investors in a certain type of security without the possibility of already making an offer as 
well as the publication of bid or offer prices.306 Case law of the CJEU guiding the 
interpretation of the first trigger has remained scarce.307 The Court has, however, clarified 
that an offer in the context of an enforced sale of securities does not qualify as an offer of 
securities to the public.308 
The second trigger for an obligation to publish a prospectus is the admittance of securities 
to trading on a regulated market.309 ‘Regulated market’ under the Prospectus Regulation 
refers to a multilateral system bringing together multiple, third-party buying and selling 
interests in financial instruments resulting in a contract.310 To qualify as a regulated market 
under the prospectus regime, admittance to the regulated market must be governed by rules 
or/and systems and additionally, it must be authorized and functioning regularly and in 
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accordance with MiFID II.311 The obligation to publish a prospectus is also geographically 
confined to an EU member state: admittance to trading of securities on a stock exchange 
outside the EU does not trigger the prospectus obligation under the Prospectus Regulation.312 
The Prospectus Regulation allows different types of exemptions to the obligation to publish 
a prospectus.313 Exemptions can be categorized into four main groups: those that are 
connected to the type of securities offered, small offerings, an offer of securities to the public 
without admittance on a regulated market, and lastly, exemptions specific to an admittance 
to trading on a regulated market.314 
The IPO prospectus of an EU-based company with admission to trading of its shares on a 
stock exchange qualifying as a regulated market in the EU has to be approved by the 
competent authority in the EU member state.315 Following from the free movement of 
services and principle of home country control, once a prospectus has been approved by the 
competed authority of the member state where the company has its registered office, the 
prospectus should be valid in the whole European Economic Area (EEA).316 Currently, there 
is no central EU-wide authority akin to the U.S. federal agency Securities and Exchange 
Commission (the SEC) to approve prospectuses of companies seeking to be listed. The 
Commission proposed centralizing prospectus approval under certain conditions, but due to 
political disagreements, this suggestion did not gain popularity and it was subsequently 
rejected.317 Di Noia and Gargantini have argued that the failure of the Commission’s 
suggestion indicates that the time was not yet ripe for the creation of one single central 
authority but rather that adding the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) as 
the 28th competent authority to approve a prospectus could pave the way for a possible future 
EU-wide central authority.318 Currently, ESMA’s fourfold activities include risk assessment, 
completing a single rulebook for EU financial markets, promoting supervisory converge, 
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and direct supervision of specific financial entities such as credit rating agencies.319 The 
existence of a powerful federal securities supervisor in the U.S. (the SEC) in contrast to 
absence of a supranational supervisor in the EU counts as one of the most significant 
differences in securities regulation between the U.S. and the EU.320 
4.2.3 Information Disclosure Obligations and Inside Information 
The EU prospectus regime complements the obligations bestowed upon companies listed on 
an exchange concerning ongoing and periodic (found in Transparency Directive) and ad hoc 
reporting obligations (found in MAR).321 This is due to the fact that the Prospectus 
Regulation focuses on the initial disclosure requirements for public offerings or listings on 
a regulated market while the primary purpose of the Transparency Directive and MAR is to 
protect investors already holding securities.322 MAR also includes a statutory definition of 
‘inside information’.323 In contrast to EU securities regulation, case law of the CJEU has 
played an important role in shaping what constitutes inside information under EU law.324 
Inside information under Article 7(1)(a) of MAR is regarded such information that is (1) 
precise, (2) non-public, (3), relating, directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers or to one 
or more financial instruments, and (4) if it were made public, would be likely to have a 
significant effect on the prices of the financial instruments or on the price of related 
derivative financial instruments. These four cumulative conditions for information to qualify 
as inside information have caused challenges in their interpretation.  
The first element of inside information under MAR is the nature of information as 
‘precise’.325 The purpose of this criterion is to ensure that speculation, opinion, and rumors 
fall out of the scope of inside information.326 Precision of information is evaluated 
considering two factors. First, information is deemed to be precise under MAR Article 7(2) 
if the information indicates a set of circumstances which exist (or may reasonably be 
expected to come into existence) or an event which has occurred or may reasonably be 
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expected to occur. Expression ‘events that may reasonably be expected to come into 
existence’ covers future events that based on an overall evaluation have a realistic prospect 
of coming into existence or an event to occur.327 Only information that relates to 
circumstances or events whose realization is unrealistic, unlikely or information concerning 
them otherwise vague falls out of the scope of the first factor of the precision requirement.328 
Secondly, precision of information is evaluated against specificity: information is 
sufficiently specific if it would allow a reasonable investor to make an investment decision 
without or with low level of risk and if it would constitute knowledge that would most likely 
be exploited in the market immediately.329 Interestingly, the direction of the effect on prices 
does not need to be known for the information to meet the first requirement of precision.330 
This interpretation has been criticized among others by Klöhn and Veil who view that 
without knowing whether the price effect will be negative or positive, investors cannot take 
advantage of the information in their investment decisions.331 On the other hand, Hansen has 
suggested that even without knowing the direction of the price effect, investors could still 
engage in protective actions against the risk.332 
The second element of inside information is its non-public nature.333 MAR does not detail 
to what extent dissemination of information transforms information to public. Relying on 
market egalitarianism, which is allowing investors to trade on an equal basis, suggests that 
price-formation process should reflect efficiently the available information; therefore for 
instance disclosing information to an influential group of institutional investors with power 
to move the market price could suffice to make the information non-public.334 Decisive is 
then the extent to which the information has been de facto disseminated to the public 
regardless of the channel, even incorrect disclosures or media coverage can cause the 
information to become non-public.335 In addition to not explicating the exact process 
whereby information becomes public, MAR also does not specify a time period after which 
information no longer qualifies as inside information. Again, if we analyze this from the 
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perspective of equality of access, insiders should wait until all investors have had an 
opportunity within reason to access and react to the new information.336  
Third, for information to be classified as inside information under Article 7(1)(a) of MAR, 
information should relate either directly or even indirectly to issuers or financial instruments. 
Fourth, Article 7(4) of MAR classifies information that might impact the price, material 
information, as inside information.337 Materiality requirement can be assessed by employing 
a probability/magnitude test: a piece of new information can be considered material if it 
would alter the existing mix of available material information and a reasonable investor 
would be likely to use it as a part of making an investment decision.338 Evaluation on whether 
the information fulfills the materiality requirement and would be taken into account by a 
reasonable investor needs to be conducted based on the relevant information available at the 
time of the alleged abuse of information took place, ex ante.339  
Article 8(4) of MAR prohibits concern five categories of primary insiders in possession of 
inside information such as members of administrative or management bodies of the issuer. 
The list is, however, non-exhaustive as Article 8(4) of MAR extends the prohibition of inside 
information obtained by ‘any legal or natural person’ in circumstances other than mentioned 
in MAR and they ‘know or ought to know that it is inside information’. This extension to 
the so called secondary insiders is somewhat more limited than to primary insiders since 
secondary insiders must have acted intentionally or negligently.340 For primary insiders it 
suffices that they have been in possession of insider information and based their investment 
decision on that information.341 
The prohibitions laid down in Article 14(a) of MAR relate to three types of behaviors: 
dealing, recommending/inducing, and disclosing.342 First, a primary insider must not engage 
or attempt to engage in ‘insider dealing’, that is, using the inside information by acquiring 
or disposing of financial instruments to which the information relates on his own account or 
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for the account of a third party, either directly or indirectly.343 Secondly, it is also prohibited 
to recommend to another person that they engage in insider dealing or induce another person 
to engage in insider dealing under Article 14(b). If a person engages in inside dealing based 
on a recommendation or inducement and the person knew or ought to have known, acting 
intentionally or negligently, their conduct is prohibited as inside dealing under Article 8(3) 
of MAR. Lastly, improper disclosure is also prohibited; persons must not unlawfully disclose 
inside information to any other person unless the disclosure is a normal part of their 
employment, profession or duties.344  
4.3 Securities Law in the U.S.  
The U.S. securities market is the largest in the world, largely due to the magnitude of the 
U.S. economy.345 Since regulation of securities markets in the U.S. falls primarily in the 
authority of federal law, I will exclude state securities (‘blue sky’) laws from the analysis.346 
The primary focus of the U.S. securities regulation has been on the protection of the so called 
‘retail investors’, that is individuals and households buying stock and bonds to accumulate 
personal savings.347 However, the share of institutional investors such as investment, pension 
funds and insurance companies has been on the rise in the U.S. since the 1950s, although 
retail investor protection continues to hold importance in policy and politics.348 I will focus 
my analysis of the U.S. securities regulation on the two most prominent federal statutes 
governing securities transactions, enacted in the aftermath of the 1929 Stock Market Crash. 
The Securities Act of 1933 (‘The 1933 Act’) regulates how companies issues corporate 
securities in the primary markets, markets for issuing new securities and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (‘The 1934 Act’) regulates the purchase and sale of securities in the 
secondary markets, markets for trading existing securities. 349 The 1934 Act also established 
the federal agency Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) with broad authority 
over all aspects of the U.S. securities industry, inter alia, the power to enforce securities 
laws and to implement additional regulations.350 The primary legislative purposes of these 
acts can be summarized as the prevention of abuses in an unregulated securities market 
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through requirements to disclose adequate information to investors and prohibition of 
fraudulent securities transactions.351 
4.3.1 Defining Securities under U.S. Securities Law 
Determining whether a financial contract qualifies as a security under U.S. law is vital, as 
U.S. securities regulation does not apply to financial contracts not deemed as securities. 
Which financial contracts qualify as securities and are thus subjected to securities regulation 
under the U.S. federal law has been a debated issue since the enactment of the 1933 and 
1934 Act.352 The ambiguity around what constitutes a security stems from the broad statutory 
definition found both in the provision of the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act, what Cox, Hillman, 
and Langevoort have described as ‘a lawyer’s dream’.353 In the classic case Landreth Timber 
Co. v. Landreth on interpreting the breadth of the statutory definition of a security, the U.S. 
Supreme Court stated that courts should presume any financial instruments designated as a 
note, stock, bond, or other instrument named in the 1933 Act and 1934 Act to be a security.354 
If the financial instrument in question is not specifically mentioned in the non-exhaustive 
list found in the acts, such as shares and bonds, the courts apply a four-part Howey test.355 
In the 1946 case SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. the U.S. Supreme Court defined a security as: (1) 
an investment of money (2) in a common enterprise with the (3) reasonable expectation of 
profit gained (4) primarily or substantially from others’ efforts.356 It is thus its economic 
function that determines whether a transaction falls within the definition of a security.357 The 
Howey test also reflects a flexible ‘substance over form’ approach to defining a security 
since the focus is on the outcome rather than on the appearance of the financial vehicle.358  
4.3.1 Registration under the Securities Act 
Under Section 5 of the 1933 Act, an issuer has to register with SEC before making a public 
offering unless the offering qualifies for an exemption from the registration requirement. 
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Securities exempted from registration include instruments that are deemed with an inherent 
low risk, are regulated by other statues, or do not count as real investments.359 Exempted 
instruments cover government securities, bank securities, short-term notes, nonprofit issues, 
and insurance policies and annuity contracts. A through discussion on the nuances of the 
exemptions is out of the scope of this study although they play a central part in fully 
comprehending U.S. securities regulation.  
Registration culminates in the issuer of securities filing a written registration statement and 
prospectus with the SEC.360 The information included in a registration statement can be 
categorized into four main groups: information about the issuer, information about the 
distribution and use of its proceeds, a description of the securities, and finally, several 
exhibits and undertakings required as a part of the registration statement.361 Similarly, the 
prospectus should contain the first three categories of information.362 Although the SEC 
reviews the registration to ensure that it complies with information disclosure requirements 
and its staff may require clarifications or corrections from the issuer, the SEC refrains from 
making any judgments about the quality or safety of the securities to be issued.363 This 
approach reflects reliance on the ‘efficient market hypothesis’, the notion that publicly 
disclosed information without the screening of a supervisory authority is judged to be 
reliable by market participants.364  
Market communications during the filing process are restricted under section 5 of the 1933 
Act. The filing process can be divided into three phases: prefiling, waiting, and post-effective 
period.365 During prefiling before filing a registration statement with the SEC offering or 
selling securities is prohibited.366 Some safe harbor rules allow permissible communications 
to the public without violating the section 5 of the 1933 Act.367 According to Cox et al., these 
safe harbor rules are a balancing act between the needs of a company in the registration 
process to release information about itself for commercial purposes to its stakeholders and 
on the other hand, the requirement of Section 5(c) not to condition the market.368 In 2005 the 
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SEC loosened some restrictions on the communications during the quiet period by allowing 
a ‘free writing prospectus’ through Rule 164 and Rule 433 of the 1933 Act. Some scholars 
have been skeptical of these reforms arguing that not only did the SEC exceed its 
congressional mandate to issue exemptions but through the reform the SEC also catered to 
the interests of those it was set out to regulate in the name of market efficiency and access 
to capital for corporate America at the cost of investor protection.369 
The waiting period is the time between the filing date and the effective date of the registration 
statement when the SEC review the information by the issuer.370 During the waiting period 
the securities can be offered but not sold.371 The issuer can distribute preliminary prospectus 
(‘red herring prospectus’) to potential investors.372 Additionally, another type of 
advertisement officially called Communications not deemed a prospectus, generally known 
as a tombstone ad, can be published during the waiting period.373 The post-effective period 
starts after the SEC has declared the registration statement effective and ends when the issuer 
has sold all the securities offered or withdraws from the sale.374 During the post-effective 
period the issuer is allowed both to offer and sell securities if the buyer has received a final 
prospectus.375  
4.3.2 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
Whereas the 1933 Act regulates the disclosure of information in issuance of securities as a 
one-time event, the 1934 Act requires periodic and ongoing disclosure by issuers of publicly 
held securities to inform current and potential shareholders.376 The 1934 Act governs the 
trading of securities in the secondary markets by requiring registration of issuers of publicly 
traded securities.377 In a nutshell, the 1933 Act registers securities whereas the 1934 Act 
registers companies. The 1934 Act also contains provisions concerning insider trading and 
prohibitions of fraud and manipulation in securities transactions.378 Next I will focus on the 
provisions of the 1934 Act that are most central to the prohibition of different forms of 
insider trading.  
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The regulation of insider trading has been described as a ‘brand’ symbol for U.S. style 
securities regulation with the aim of promoting fair play in the stock markets.379 Under U.S. 
law, and more specifically under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5380, insiders 
can be corporate officers, directors, employees, lawyers, consultants, accountants, majority 
shareholders, or any other individuals who receive private information regarding the trading 
of securities. The 1934 Act bans three types of insider trading: section 16 focuses prohibits 
on short-swing trading, section 10(b) bans classic insider trading, and misappropriation is a 
violation of §10(b) of the 1934 Act.  
Section 16 of the 1934 Act concerns statutory insiders; officers, directors, and controlling 
stakeholders with an ownership stake of the company exceeding 10 %. Statutory insiders are 
required under section 16(a) to fulfill two separate requirements: first, they must report their 
ownership and trading of the company’s securities to the SEC. Secondly, they have to return 
all profits made from the sale of company stock within any six-month period to the company; 
short-swing profits, hence the name short-swing trading. Since section 16(b) imposes strict 
liability on statutory insiders earning profits from short-swing sales, even in the absence of 
market abuse or use of inside information the insiders have to turn over the profits to the 
company. 
Section 10(b) includes a prohibition of classic insider trading. A corporate insider has 
engaged in insider trading if that person has material, nonpublic information and he or she 
breaches a fiduciary duty to their company by trading on the information regardless of 
whether they earn a profit or not.381 According to the SEC, insiders are subjected to ‘abstain 
or disclose’ rule in that an individual with material inside information should either refrain 
from using the information or disclose the information to the other parties involved in the 
transaction.382 Under the test laid down in Chiarella v. Unites States, insiders not only 
include officers and directors of the company but also anybody entrusted with corporate 
information for a corporate purpose and the corporation has a proper purpose for keeping 
the information confidential.383 The U.S. Supreme Court held that the ‘abstain or disclose’ 
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rule applies only to those who owe a fiduciary duty to the company. Fiduciary duty can also 
be broken when an insider does not trade on insider information him or herself but instead 
passes on the information to somebody else, a tippee, who then in turn engages in insider 
trading.384 Insiders are liable as tippers if they reveal material, nonpublic information about 
their company violating their fiduciary duty (1) knowing that the information is confidential 
and (2) they benefit or expect to benefit directly or indirectly.385 Tippees can be held liable 
even if they have no fiduciary relation to the company if they (1) trade on the information, 
(2) they know it to be confidential, (3) they know it came from an insider violating their 
fiduciary duty, and the (4) insider benefited or expected to benefit.386 
In addition to prohibitions of short-swing trading and classic insider trading by corporate 
insiders, the U.S. securities regulation has expanded its scope to curb insider trading in 
accordance with the misappropriation theory.387 In United States v. O’Hagan the Supreme 
Court officially endorsed the misappropriation theory clarifying as its aim the promotion of 
investor confidence through honest securities markets and its applicability to rule 10b-5.388 
Rule 10b-5 is a catch-all provision and the most central anti-fraud securities rule as it applies 
to ‘any person’ who ‘defrauds’ another person in the ‘purchase or sale of any security’.389 
The misappropriation theory holds that it is illegal for individuals who have material 
nonpublic information but owe no fiduciary duty to the company’s shareholders to reveal or 
make use of insider information as this would constitute a breach of duty to the source of 
information.390 All in all, it can be concluded that the U.S. securities black law and common 
law precedents prohibit a wide range of uses of insider information to achieve fairness in the 
securities markets. 
4.4 Banking Law in the EU  
The EU banking law is a set of provisions of European financial law with two main goals.391 
The first objective is to materialize the two basic freedoms of the TFEU: the freedoms of EU 
credit institutions392 to set up branches and to provide financial services without 
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establishment in other member states as a part of negative financial integration.393 The 
second objective aims at ensuring the stability of the European banking system that can be 
threatened by contagious failures of credit institutions to achieve positive financial 
integration.394  
Spurred by the financial turmoil of 2007-09 and its aftermath, the idea of establishing a 
European Banking Union (EBU) was put forth in 2012.395 The underlying motivation behind 
the EBU was to create a stronger and more centralized system of financial supervision and 
resolution to restore credibility and stability to the euro area banking system by breaking the 
vicious circle between banks and sovereign states.396 What does a banking union in European 
context in practice entail? The EBU can be understood as a europeanized bank safety net 
comprising of three pillars: the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM), and the Common Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS).397 Next, I will 
analyze main features of these three pillars as well as evaluate the effectiveness of the EU 
financial safety net. 
4.4.1 European Banking Union: A Tale of Three Pillars 
The EBU is founded on several types of legal acts varying from EU secondary legislation to 
an assortment of soft law instruments such as guidelines and recommendations.398 The 
variety in legislative instruments and absence of full harmonization in forming the EBU 
entails that member states enjoy levels of discretion, creating a complex structure with 
idiosyncratic organizational features.399 The institutional and regulatory initiatives towards 
establishing the first two pillars of the EBU took place during 2013 and 2014.400  
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The first pillar, the SSM, was realized within the existing Treaty framework based on Article 
127(6) of the TFEU. This article grants the power to the Council to confer on the ECB 
specific tasks related to the prudential supervision of credit institutions.401 The ECB was 
given the authority to directly supervise credit institutions in the Eurozone and non-euro area 
participating member states categorized as ‘significant’.402 The significance of the credit 
institutions is evaluated based on the total value of their assets, their importance for the 
economy of the country in which they are located or the EU at large, the scale of their cross-
border activities, and whether they have been recapitalized by public funds.403 Banking 
supervision in the EU is not, however, completely denationalized; there is no single 
supervisory authority since the supervision of ‘less significant’ institutions is under the remit 
of national competent authorities (NCAs) while the broad oversight of the financial markets 
sits with the ECB.404 Although the separation of jurisdiction between the ECB and the NCAs 
seems at first glance clear-cut, recent case law of the CJEU demonstrates that the extent to 
which the ECB holds all the necessary corresponding national powers (i.e. powers provided 
in national law) is unclear.405 
The second pillar, the Single Resolution Mechanism, is complementary to the first 
supervisory pillar as the resolution pillar.406 The normative foundation for SRM is found in 
the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the SRM regulation.407 The SRM 
is a central institution for bank resolution in the EU applicable to troubled banks from 
member state within the Eurozone or that are established in a member state choosing to 
participate in the EBU.408 The SRM aims to resolve failing banks with minimal impact to 
tax payers and the real economy.409  
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How exactly the SRM operates is complicated.410 In case of a bank fail, the SRM allows 
bank resolution to be managed through the Single Resolution Board (SRB), a new EU 
resolution authority with centralized decision-making powers with respect to resolution.411 
The SRB drafts resolution plans consisting of specific actions to be taken by national 
resolution authorities under different bank failure scenarios based on the information 
received form each credit institution.412 The SRB is the only institution with competence to 
activate the resolution process.413 The BRRD requires that shareholders and creditors of a 
bank undergoing resolution must be ‘bailed-in’, in other words absorb losses, for a minimum 
of 8 percent of the bank’s total liabilities before public funds are used.414 The SRB is 
accompanied by the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) financed ex ante by the banking sector 
covered by the SRM.415 The SRF provides a fiscal backstop that enables credit institutions 
to stay in operation until relevant resolution tools have been implemented.416 
The third pillar of the EBU, European Deposit Insurance Scheme, builds on the system of 
national deposit guarantee schemes (DGS) regulated by Directive 2014/49/EU. Under the 
directive, all deposits up to €100 000 are protected through national DGSs in the EU.417 The 
Commission published a proposal for a Regulation to establish a European Deposit 
Insurance Scheme (EDIS) to complement the existing national deposit insurance funds.418 
EDIS would ensure that deposits are protected to the same degree across the EBU.419 The 
proposal includes three steps toward an EDIS: the ‘re-insurance phase’, the ‘co-insurance 
phase’ and the ‘full insurance’.420 In the re-insurance a national DGS can access EDIS funds 
only when it has first exhausted all its own resources.421 In the co-insurance phase DGS 
would not be required to exhaust its own funds before EDIS would contribute a share of the 
costs from the moment that bank depositors need to access their funds.422 Lastly, the full 
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insurance phase entails that full funding of liquidity needs and all losses due to a payout 
event or contributions to resolution are covered by EDIS.423 
EDIS has not yet been realized which means that also the EBU remains incomplete.424 
Reasons for this include EU member states’ divergent positions on the design of the system 
and its final stage, as well as the timing of the setting up the system.425 Additionally, many 
laws that impact management of banking crisis such as insolvency laws have not been fully 
harmonized.426 Mario Draghi, the former president of the ECB, has argued that the 
combination of the SRM and EDIS could lead to a European version of the U.S. Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation.427 
4.4.2 Financial Safety Net in the EU – Currently Inadequate?  
Currently the financial safety net at the EU level comprises mainly of the ECB, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, national deposit guarantee systems, and financial 
supervisory system at national and EU level.428 Dománska-Szaruga has warned that the 
financial safety net in the EU is inadequate since the European system of financial 
supervision in its current form is a hybrid form of transnational and national actors, causing 
challenges in coordination of unified supervision.429 In a similar vein, Gelpern and Véron 
have lamented that without a European deposit insurance, creating a full safety net for the 
banking sector in the EU is challenging.430 
Banking market in the retail sector has not been significantly integrated at the EU level since 
regulation of retail banking has been largely been a national, not an EU level, matter.431 The 
SSM supervision carried out by the European Central Bank (ECB) at the EU level since 
2014 has reduced the fragmentation of the European banking system.432 However, despite 
efforts to increase financial integration through the Banking Union, the EU has yet to reach 
'domestic' banking market as banks are still associated with their respective sovereigns and 
differences between banking systems in different member states persist.433  
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4.5 Banking Law in the U.S.  
The regulatory framework of U.S. banking has been built over more than a century.434 Its 
development has been a series of responses to and significant market developments which 
has caused the regulatory regime to become complex and fragmented.435 The U.S. regulatory 
system can be characterized as ‘functional’ in that financial products or services are usually 
regulated according to their function as opposed to who offers the product or participates in 
the activity.436 Banking regulation in the U.S. caters to multiple goals: perhaps the most 
important justification for regulation is excessive risk-taking of financial intermediaries but 
also protection of public claimants, elimination of externalities from the failure of 
intermediaries, and even attending to political visions underlying the regulatory landscape 
of U.S. banking.437  
I will provide an overview of the distinct features of the U.S. banking regulatory framework 
prior to a similar introduction into the EU banking regulation which will pave the way for a 
comparison of the two banking regulatory systems. I will focus on key features of the U.S. 
banking regime, namely the dual banking system and prohibitions of interstate banking 
across state lines. I will introduce components of a U.S. financial safety net in banking: 
financial supervisory institutions, deposits guarantee system, and the central bank.438  
4.5.1 Dual Banking System and Prohibitions on Interstate Banking 
In the U.S. the usage of the term ‘bank’ is narrower compared to the broader concept of bank 
as a depository institution in European practice.439 In the U.S. commercial banks are 
separated from other depository institutions such as thrifts and credit unions.440 Here again 
we see that seemingly mundane words can take on different meanings depending on the 
jurisdiction, a reoccurring theme of this study. 
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A distinct feature of the U.S. bank regulation is the dual state-federal system of regulation, 
the dual banking system.441 This dual bank chartering system consisting of federal and state 
level regulation entails that to open a commercial bank in the U.S., a charter from either a 
state or federal government is required.442 Under the National Bank Act, the activities of 
federally chartered banks are limited to ‘the business of banking’ which generally excludes 
insurance and securities underwriting, real estate investment, and ordinary commercial 
activities.443 The dual banking system of the U.S. as well as restrictions on bank activities 
has its historical roots in a federalist tradition marked by distrust of centralized power and 
consequently, hesitance to concentrate too much power in a national government.444 
Depository institutions in the U.S. are regulated by an interconnected and overlapping web 
of different regulators. Namely the existence of a dual charter raises regulatory issues as 
opting for a federal or a national charter affects the choice of banking regulator(s).445 
National banks are chartered and supervised by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC).446 State banks in turn are chartered and supervised by state regulators.447 Banks that 
are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation are also regulated by the same 
entity.448 Additionally, all national banks need to be members of the Federal Reserve and all 
Fed member banks must be insured by the FDIC, consequently all national banks are 
regulated by the Comptroller of the Currency, the Fed, and the FDIC.449 
Another distinctive feature of U.S. banking regulation in addition to dual banking system 
and complex structure of multiple regulators is that the U.S. has historically imposed strict 
limits on the activities and affiliations of banks and their interstate expansion.450 The 
McFadden Act of 1927 outlawed interstate branching entirely.451 Prohibitions on interstate 
and even intrastate branching were driven by concerns that large banks would have 
excessively concentration of economic power, that they would restrict access to credit, 
misuse their economic power for political ends, or contribute to systemic risk, all this to the 
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detriment of consumers.452 A somewhat competing explanation attributes prohibition of 
interstate banking on states’ economic interests: since states received only charter fees from 
banks incorporated in their respective state, states prohibited out-of-state banks from 
operating in their territories.453 Due to market and technological pressures interstate banking 
restrictions were lifted by the passing of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act of 1994 that repealed the McFadden Act’s prohibitions and allowed banks to 
diversify geographically. 
4.5.2 The Financial Safety Net in the U.S.  
The Banking Act of 1933 (the Glass-Steagall Act) is a part of key legislation affecting the 
U.S. banking industry as this Act forced the separation of commercial banks from 
investments banks. Additionally, the Glass-Steagall Act created a nationwide deposit 
insurance by the establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).454 The 
FDIC can be seen to form one foundational elements of the U.S. financial safety net. Once 
again, this banking legislation was enacted as a response to crisis, more precisely banking 
panics and bank failures during the Great Depression in the 1930s.455 Kirkegaard has argued 
that forming the FDIC counts as the greatest centralizing move of the U.S. banking sector 
since the FDIC acts as a single insurance provider for all Americans. 456  
Currently the FDIC guarantees that a depositor will receive the full account balance of 
deposit accounts up to USD 250,000 per insured bank in case of a bank failure.457 After a 
bank fails, the FDIC typically pays immediately insured depositors and replaces them in 
bank liquidation enjoying a depositor preference at the expense of other creditors.458 In 
addition to deposit insurance, the financial safety net in banking in the U.S. also comprises 
of the Federal Reserve System (the Fed).459 The Fed was created by the Federal Reserve Act 
of 1913 with a dual mandate of aiming at full employment and price stability and serve as a 
lender of last resort to provide liquidity to banks during economic crises.460 In international 
comparison, the U.S. was a latecomer to create a lender of last resort with two earlier failed 
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attempts to form a central bank.461 This relates to historical debates discussed earlier, namely 
differing views between those that favored centralizing economic power to form a central 
bank and those that were hesitant to render centralized economic power and preferred to 
keep economic power more dispersed.462 
4.5.3 Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis  
No contemporary discussion on banking regulation in the U.S. would be complete without 
at least a reference to the financial crisis of 2007–2009. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 was enacted as an attempt to prevent another crisis 
and it can be seen to strike a balance between the forces of centralization and 
decentralization.463 Whereas new federal agencies were created such as the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) with a mission of identifying risks to financial stability 
from large interconnected financial institutions and utilities and the supervisory role of the 
Fed was expanded to all systematically important financial institutions (SIFIs), the dual 
banking system remained unaltered.464  
5. Conclusions 
Determining the focus of comparative law has divided comparatists: many have viewed 
similarities of legal cultures as the point of departure whereas some have presumed 
differences465. These polarized stances have been interpreted to reflect a deeper paradigmatic 
dichotomy of nature versus cultural divide.466 Although either views – or rather paradigms 
– have their merits, in this study I do not strictly adhere to either of these approaches. I will 
instead strive to give equal attention to both differences and similarities between the 
analyzed fields of law and in so doing, join the growing number of comparatists favoring the 
                                                 
461 Barr, Jackson, and Tahyar (2016) 44. 
462 ibid 40–41. 
463 Gelpern and Véron (2018) 144. 
464 Gelpern and Véron (2018) 144. To view the list of the tasks of the FSOC, see Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, §112(a). 
465 Most notably, Zweigert and Kötz (1998) have in their seminal book ‘An Introduction to Comparative 
Law’ focused on the similarities across legal cultures adopting a praesumptio similitudinis. On the other 
hand, a vocal advocate of legal diversity has been Legrand (1999:102–103) for whom comparison is first and 
foremost about seeking differences. According to him, there are major differences in ways of thinking about 
law, what he has coined as legal mentality, mentalité, across legal cultures (Legrand, 1996:60). Legrand’s 
notion of legal mentality bears some resemblance to the concept of mental program developed by social 
psychologist Hofstede in studying national cultures as programming of the mind that distinguishes the 
members of one group from another (Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 2010:4). Both views are ingrained 
with the idea that individuals are socialized into a given culture, be it legal or national, which becomes the 
operating system of the mind underlying the thoughts and actions of individual in the given culture.   
466 Samuel (2007) 230. 
59 
 
middle ground approach.467 To raise the conceptual level of the analysis, I will also aim to 
identify underlying reasons for the found differences and similarities.  
5.1 Explaining Differences in the EU and the U.S.  
So far the focus has been on describing ‘black letter law’ and case law from the EU and the 
U.S. in the major areas of IPR law and financial markets law. This description has laid the 
necessary groundwork for mapping the legal landscape of both jurisdictions. To further the 
analysis of this study in the following section I will strive to identify and explain some of 
the major divergences in the intellectual property laws of the EU and the U.S.  
5.1.1 Differences in Intellectual Property Rights  
5.1.1.1 Patent Law 
When comparing patent law in the EU and the U.S., at the onset of the analysis some 
fundamental differences need to be addressed. To begin with, the patent system in Europe is 
not based on merely EU legislation: the European Patent Office is not an EU institution, 
which entails that legally it is not bound by the Biotech Directive nor the case law of the 
CJEU.468 The existence of EPO as outside the EU institutional and legislative structure dates 
back to the inception of the EU because since then there has been controversy surrounding 
whether the powers of the EU extend to legislating internal IP matters and especially 
patents.469 However, starting from the 1990s the CJEU has considered purely external trade 
aspects of IPRs to fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the EU and currently, the EU has 
the competence to harmonize even internal IP legislation.470  
Adding to the legal pluralism in Europe is the current state of affairs that both the Unitary 
Patent and the Unified Patent Court have not yet been realized which means that 
enforceability of patents has been left to national European courts. Failure to harmonize EU 
patent law can be seen as factor leading to legal uncertainty and diminish the attractiveness 
of acquiring a patent in European countries, also creating a possibility for ‘forum shopping’ 
as litigants seek to find the national court most likely to favor their position. Additionally, 
the purpose of the European patent system differs from that of the U.S. patent system. The 
European patent system is driven by support for technological innovations since the EPO 
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conceives inventions as patentable for their technical aspects.471 In contrast, the purpose of 
the U.S. patent system is generally accepted as promoting the progress of practical, rather 
than technical, arts.472 
Whereas computer programs are excluded from patents in Europe under the article 52(2) of 
the EPC, the U.S. has not traditionally explicitly excluded business methods or software 
inventions from patentability.473 Although in Bilski v. Kappos the U.S. Supreme Court 
rejected a categorical exclusion of business methods from patent eligibility, only four years 
later in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International the same Court held that inventions claiming 
abstract ideas included in the framework of software or business methods are no longer 
patentable in the U.S. 474 This implies that inventions claiming abstract ideas included in the 
framework of software or business methods are no longer eligible for a patent in the U.S. 
and thus, the U.S. practice has taken a step closer to Europe.475 
Article 53 of the EPC excludes inventions on the grounds of order public or morality. Similar 
morality-based exclusions are not found in U.S. patent law.476 The EPC also contains explicit 
exclusions from patent eligibility such as scientific theories and computer programs but the 
U.S. patent clauses do not define which types of inventions or discoveries are excluded from 
patentability.477 These differences can at least in part be explained by the generally accepted 
notion that rules governing unpatentable subject-matter should be based on the Constitution 
or the framer’s intent.478 However, some scholars have proposed that the framers’ attitudes 
were more open for a wider concept of patentability than the conventional wisdom assumes 
and thus there are few Constitutional limits on patentable subject matter.479 Landers has 
proposed that relying on historical definitions can be viewed as a liability when defining 
patentability as technology is bound to evolve constantly.480 Whereas in Europe, the limits 
on patentability have been expressed mostly in positive law, in the U.S. it has been the task 
of the courts and the U.S. patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to limit patent subject 
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matter.481 Which instance, the legislator or the court, should decide on the limits of 
patentability reflects a fundamental divide between the common law and Romano-Germanic 
law. In common law, precedents and courts play a decisive role in formulating legal rules 
whereas in Romano-Germanic law statutory law is seen to cover most if not all legal 
problems and the role of courts is to merely solve individual cases without wider 
implications.482 
5.1.1.2 Copyright Law  
One of the main distinctive features between the concept of copyright between the U.S. and 
the EU is their differing outlook on the existence of moral rights. Whereas common-law 
countries view that natural rights not to be an inherent part of copyright protection, civil law 
countries to which most EU member states belong to, recognize artists’ moral rights to their 
work.483 Consequently, the main rationale copyright protection in the U.S. is utilitarian: to 
promote the progress of the creative and expressive arts to advance societal culture, the 
primary social utility objective underlying copyrights regimes in many EU countries is based 
on the recognition of natural rights, ‘droit d´auteur’, according to which the authors have a 
personal connection with and responsibility for the works they create in a way that the works 
can be viewed as extensions of themselves.484 Even though the U.S. became a signatory to 
the Berne Convention, since the Convention does not clearly articulate a method nor require 
the implementation of specific laws to address protection sufficient to comply with Article 
6bis, the U.S. has been hesitant to embrace the concept of moral rights.485  
The difference in copyright doctrine regarding moral rights in the EU and respectively in the 
U.S. is thus attributable to a divide between the legal cultures of the common law and civil 
law or Romano-Germanic law. To make further sense of the different outlook between U.S. 
and EU countries, we may turn to national culture as one viable explanation. American legal 
scholar Holst has explained the reluctance of the U.S. to incorporate the moral rights in its 
legal framework of IP protection on cultural grounds, ‘Art and literary works were a 
fundamental part of European culture, while U.S. culture developed around industry and 
economy’.486 A related explanation drawing on economic analysis explains the reluctance of 
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the U.S. to adopt the Berne Convention by stating that since the U.S. has until recently been 
mainly an importer of intellectual property, it has not served its economic interests to protect 
the rights of producers.487 Conversely, as the importance of U.S. exports covered by 
conventional copyright has increased, signing the Berne Convention made sense to ensure 
enforcement of rights of American artists in foreign nations.488 
Other notable differences in copyright include differences in copyright doctrine and the role 
of registration. For instance, the merger doctrine is not explicitly recognized in copyright 
internationally outside of the U.S. as it has emerged as a common law concept in the U.S. 
case law.489 The fair use doctrine limiting the rights of copyright holders is more broadly 
defined in the U.S. compared to the EU.490 
5.1.1.3 Trademark Law 
Although we refer to trademarks in the EU and the U.S. as if it is an identical legal 
concept, the semantic content of a trademark on different sides of the Atlantic is not 
entirely identical. In the U.S. the trademark right is a right of exclusion, whereas in civil 
law nations, to which many EU member states belong to, a trademark is conceived as a 
corporeal thing to be owned, intellectual property.491 The U.S. system on trademark 
protection is based on the consumer’s right to be free from deception, adequate incentive to 
continue using trademarks by the trademark holders, and lastly, rights of third parties to 
compete.492 Richard Posner, a leading legal scholar in the U.S., has sided with the view 
that trademarks are merely identifiers of quality and origin to consumers and not property 
per se.493 On the contrary, Pila and Torremans see the function of the European trademark 
law to extend beyond merely the identifying function since trademark holders’ rights 
include excludability, which justifies their categorization into ‘rights of property’.494 Port 
attributes divergence in the theoretical underpinnings of trademark law between the U.S. 
and the civil law countries as a reason for unsuccessful attempts to harmonize protection of 
trademarks.495 
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Likelihood of confusion is a universally recognized concept in trademark doctrine although 
variations in its implementation exist.496 Despite the universality of likelihood of confusion 
and evaluation connected to it, some differences connected to this concept between the U.S. 
and the EU still persist. The U.S. subscribes to a multifactor test to measure likelihood of 
confusion for trademarks.497 The thirteen federal circuits all apply their own formulations of 
the test which means that implementing the concept of likelihood of confusion varies from 
state to state.498 In his influential paper, Beebe has lamented the Babelian state of affairs with 
the multifactor test with different judges short-circuiting the test and has advocated instead 
a national standard multifactor test to improve predictability and proficiency of trademark 
infringement.499 In contrast, the EU subscribes to a unitary test enforced in all the EU 
member states in measuring likelihood of confusion.500 This means that the standards by 
which likelihood of confusion are assessed are more aligned between different EU member 
states than between the thirteen federal circuits of the U.S.  
The U.S. and the EU, both signatories to the TRIPS Agreement, have a diverging stance on 
the importance of implementing their legislation in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement 
governing GIs. European vintners have long been vocal critics of the use of European GIs 
such as Champagne and Chablis on U.S. wines and consequently, the EU has pressured the 
U.S. to respect the TRIPS Agreement by offering protection to foreign GIs.501 This battle 
between the U.S. and the EU on intellectual property protection stems from differing 
political and economic interests among the parties. Since the EU has one of the most diverse 
portfolios of protected GIs, it has been in its interest to advocate strong protection of GIs.502 
For the EU, the GIs are indications of origin as sources of cultural and economic wealth.503 
Interestingly, the U.S. has switched its role to being the party that relies on adherence to the 
TRIPS Agreement as Chinese vintners have registered a U.S. wine mark as a trademark.504 
There are also differences regarding registration of trademarks in the EU and the U.S. In the 
U.S. registered and unregistered trademarks receive fairly similar protection.505 In contrast, 
in the EU the main point of departure for receiving trademark protection is registration. This 
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can be explained historically: traditionally trademarks formed a part of the private sector in 
Europe, but as the European society became more industrialized, a more formal system with 
central authority of the state was needed: across Europe, trademark laws started to rely on a 
system of registration.506 
5.1.2 Differences in Financial Markets Law 
5.1.2.1 Securities Markets Law 
European securities markets have remained underdeveloped compared to those of the U.S. 
for a host of factors.507 Reasons include obstacles for cross-border transactions such as 
capital markets remaining a national issue regulated by national corporate law, tax codes, 
and conflict-of-laws principles.508 Moreover, EU pension funds have holdings amounting to 
only half of those of their U.S. counterparts that are key investors in the U.S. capital 
markets.509 Also the tendency among household investors to favor investing in one’s home 
country due to legal and linguistic barriers, the home country bias, has kept the EU securities 
markets less developed compared to the U.S.510 Measures identified in the CMU have the 
purpose of making the securities markets in EU more developed akin to the U.S.511 
Additionally, in contrast to significant direct holdings by individuals in the U.S., European 
markets have been long dominated by institutions.512 This entails that the U.S. securities 
regulation has laid heavy focus on protecting retail investors whereas in Europe economic 
growth has been fueled to large part by a tradition of bank financing.513 As outlined before, 
the European Commission has taken steps to create a stronger securities market in the EU 
by easing the process of raising funds in the EU securities markets and by creating a CMU.514 
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Interestingly, the U.S. securities market is often viewed as a benchmark for the desired future 
development of the EU securities market, indicating yearn from the European perspective to 
approximate the EU securities market closer to the U.S. securities market.515 
The EU has also lagged behind the U.S. in the area of insider dealing: the first EU-level 
regulatory measure prohibiting insider dealing was adopted as late as at the end of the 
1980s.516 At the time the U.S. as a ‘first comer’ had already an established doctrine of 
prohibitions of insider trading developed through case law and SEC regulations.517 The more 
stagnant progress of the EU insider dealing regime makes sense given the slower 
development of market finance in the EU compared to the U.S.518 The decision-making 
mechanisms of the union also played a role: EU member states, especially Germany, were 
reluctant to adopt a statutory prohibition on insider dealing.519 At the substantive level, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has based the prohibition of insider trading on the violation of fiduciary 
duties not to broaden the scope of insider trading in excess and cause chilling effects on 
financial markets.520 In the EU, in contrast, the approach to prohibit insider dealing has been 
a straightforward rule embracing the parity-of-information approach: any person in 
possession of private, price-sensitive information, which qualifies as inside information, is 
banned from trading.521  
There are also differences in authorities regulating the securities markets between the U.S. 
and the EU. Regulatory authority in the U.S. has been concentrated on a single federal 
agency, the SEC, with mandate to formulate policy goals, draft legislation, and carry out 
enforcement whereas legislation at the EU level has long been the result of negotiation 
process among the member states steered by the Commission and framed with the 
participation of the European parliament.522 Front line market supervision and law 
enforcement are still in the authority of national financial market supervisors of member 
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states whereas ESMA’s tasks include, inter alia, the promotion of supervisory congruence 
and consistency in rule application.523 
This discrepancy of centralization of regulatory authority between the EU and the U.S. and 
the SEC’s success in overseeing the development of the most sophisticated securities market 
in the world have caused many commentators to suggest forming a single European 
securities regulator modeled after the SEC.524 Again, we observe the reoccurring theme of 
Europeans’ attempts to emulate the success of the securities market in the U.S. Meanwhile, 
even proponents of the European model of the SEC have recognized that transplanting the 
SEC as such into the EU would not possible for the vast political, economics, and regulatory 
differences between the EU and the U.S.525 Whereas the U.S. was already a strong, unified 
country with established political and economic ideology and first and foremost a well-
functioning single securities market at the inception of the SEC in the 1930s, the European 
regulatory counterpart would enjoy none of these features as member states are separated by 
culture and legal tradition and they have been reluctant to give up regulatory control of their 
securities markets, hindering the formation of a single securities market at the EU level 
comparable to the U.S. securities market.526  
The prospectus and market abuse regime, the European equivalents of the U.S. 1933 and 
1934 Acts, have assimilated the regulation of securities within the EU to that of the U.S. 
Despite of this, significant substantive differences between the U.S. and EU approach to 
securities regulation persist. Securities regulation in the U.S. is heavily based on case law 
interpreting the 1933 and 1934 Act that centers on the core economic characteristic of an 
investment contract.527 EU prospectus regulation is in turn driven by a complicated 
arrangement of much more recent black letter law that focuses on whether issued units are 
transferable, standardized, and negotiable.528 Hacker and Thomale have proposed that the 
U.S. prospectus regulation more readily addresses questions essential to the functions of the 
prospectus regulation such as reducing information asymmetries about investment risks 
compared to EU prospectus regulation that only indirectly touches upon core functions of 
prospectus regulation.529 This assertion, although voiced through lenses favoring the native 
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country of Hacker and Thomale, contains at least a seed of truth to it: EU securities 
regulation and more specifically EU prospectus regime is unquestionably more fragmented 
by design with multiple layers of legislation and amendments. 
Both in the EU and the U.S., it is essential to determine whether a financial vehicle qualifies 
as a security to know whether securities laws apply. However, the criteria whereby the nature 
of the financial instrument is evaluated differs significantly between these jurisdictions: in 
the U.S. the primary tool is the four-part Howey test that emphasizes the outcome of a 
transaction rather than its legal form.530 In the EU the statutory requirements focus on the 
transfer of units in the secondary market rather than on the underlying investment 
characteristics. Since the statutory requirements in the EU are set out in detail, they minimize 
the possibility of discretion, which is in stark contrast to the more flexible, ‘substance over 
form’ approach chosen by the U.S. Supreme Court.531 Maume and Fromberger have sought 
to explain this difference by EU lawmakers’ aim to achieve a uniform interpretation of 
securities laws within all the member states by employing detailed criteria on a security.532 
They further argue that whereas the black-letter approach of the EU can offer high level of 
legal certainty to the markets, applying a ‘substance over form’ approach of the U.S. in the 
EU context would result in regulatory divergences between the courts of different member 
states and thus impede harmonization.533  
All in all, where the federal statutes governing the primary and secondary securities markets 
in the U.S. have been applied in the context of a unified, single nation with a vibrant 
securities market and historically a wide retail investor base, the EU has long sought to 
integrate the national securities markets of its member states into a single financial market 
through differing harmonizing approaches entailing a host of directives and more recently, 
heavier focus on regulations to enable more uniform application of EU securities law. 
Prohibition on trading on inside information in the EU is more recent but more extensive 
whereas the U.S. approach is older and more limited in scope.534 
5.1.2.2 Banking Law 
Mistrust of large concentrated economic power, especially in the banking sector, remains to 
this day for historical reasons as one of the key distinct features of the U.S. banking 
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system.535 Although the U.S. banking sector is concentrated on the top with the five largest 
firms holding 47% of commercial banking assets, there are almost 6,000 community banks, 
making the U.S. banking sector more fragmented compared to the EU and for that matter, 
one of the least concentrated banking markets in the world.536 In contrast, according to 
Gelpern and Véron, 64 % of the euro area’s significant banks represent 61 % of total assets 
owned by governments, political foundations, or cooperate structures, which are prone to 
different types of political influence.537 
Although both the EU and the U.S. constitute a banking union, the historical path preceding 
their development and the speed of the process differ significantly on different sides of the 
Atlantic.538 Whereas the EU started with a vision of single market followed by a monetary 
union and banking union, the U.S. had well into the 20th century a volatile and fragmented 
banking sector with two failed attempts to establish a central bank culminating finally in the 
establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1913.539 Only as late as in the mid-1990s 
with the lifting of prohibitions of interstate banking we can talk about a true U.S. banking 
union.540 It took more than two centuries for the U.S. banking union to evolve to its current 
state and even today, it remains a constant work in process.541 The institutional development 
of banking union at the EU level has evolved in contrast at a more rapid pace.542 The first 
phase of the banking union in the EU was completed in less than four years: the initiation of 
banking union took place in mid-2012, key legislation was adopted in 2013–14, and 
implemented in 2014–2016.543  
The molding of the banking union in the U.S. has evolved over a much longer period than 
its recent EU counterpart and therefore drawing parallels between these two forms of 
banking union can be challenging. Whereas all the euro area banks now obtain their charter 
or license straight from the ECB, the dual federal-state chartering system with supervisory 
fragmentation remains in force in the U.S.544 What follows from this is that whereas 
establishing the EBU was a fast response to the financial crisis, the crisis response in the 
U.S. culminated in the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act seeking to balance decentralization 
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and centralization instead of political commitment to national banking as happened in the 
EU.545  
When it comes to variations in the content of the crisis response, the first pillar of the EBU 
granted the ECB supervisory power over significant institutions as did the Dodd-Frank Act 
in the U.S. to the Financial Stability Oversight Council.546 The difference between the 
approaches of the EU and the U.S. is that the FSOC can designate systematically important 
nonbank financial institutions for supervision by the Fed under enhanced prudential 
standards whereas the supervisory tasks of the ECB are exclusively limited to banks.547 The 
U.S. approach is better supported by the common notion that other financial institutions apart 
from banks can also threaten the stability of the financial system.548 Ferran and Babis have 
explained the ECB’s limited institutional focus on banks by political obstacles to bring about 
a needed treaty change to TFEU, Article 127(6), to widen the mandate of the ECB as well 
as by the urgency in the crisis wrecked political climate of the EU to break the vicious circle 
between banks and sovereigns.549 
Also concerning the third pillar of the EBU, the history of the European regulation of deposit 
insurance schemes is more recent than that of the U.S.550 Whereas the first directive on 
European DGSs only set a minimum level of harmonization between domestic ‘deposit 
guarantee schemes’ in the EU, the current DGS Directive aims to achieve the maximum 
harmonization of the rules in this field.551 
5.2 Explaining Similarities of the EU and the U.S. 
From differences, I will now turn to identifying commonalities between and among the IP 
legislation of the EU and the U.S. to give meaning to comparative convergence. This 
endeavor is inspired by Lundmark’s exhortation, ‘it is hoped that future scholars will take a 
more nuanced view of [...] the supposed divide between the common law and civil law 
worlds without forgetting that all legal systems in both of these traditions have far more in 
                                                 
545 ibid 144. 
546 For the ECB’s supervisory powers, see Article 6, SSMR and for the FSOC’s authority to designate 
nonbank institutions as SIFIs, see Section 113 of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
547 Ferran and Babis (2013) 259. 
548 ibid 259. 
549 ibid.  
550 Morra (2019) 394.  
551 Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit-guarantee 
schemes [1994] OJ L 135/5; Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes (recast) [2014] OJ L 173/149, recital 6. 
70 
 
common with each other than not’.552 Not all but a majority of the EU member states belong 
to the Romano-Germanic or civil law legal tradition, whereas the U.S. is with some notable 
exceptions (such as the state of Louisiana with a mixed legal system) a common law country.   
5.2.1 Similarities in Intellectual Property Rights  
Congruence has often been assigned as an explanatory factor for variation of compared 
jurisdictions in comparative literature.553 Furthermore, harmonization and convergence have 
been treated separately where harmonization has been viewed as a deliberate process and 
convergence as evolving without planning.554 Siems has further distinguished convergence 
through congruence and congruence through pressure.555 Convergence through congruence 
has taken place due to similar social, political and economic circumstances on an 
international level and manifested by growing interdependencies of societies, cultures, and 
economies.556 One can credibly postulate that the U.S. and the EU as representatives of 
Western capitalist and democratic thought with highly interdependent economies have been 
faced with similar challenges socially, politically, and economically, thus explaining some 
of the found similarities in their respective IP regimes. Consequently, despite fundamental 
differences in the rationale granting IP rights with European approach based on natural rights 
and the Anglo-American on market utilitarianism, both have engaged themselves in 
international efforts aiming at achieving a high-level IP protection.557 
Convergence through pressure on the other hand refers to the influence of international and 
regional organizations and lobbying efforts.558 Similarities between the EU and the U.S. in 
IP law can be at least partly explained by international harmonization of IP law through 
forming various organizations and agreements governing intellectual property commodities. 
Consequently, convergence in IP laws is not only expected but a requirement since the U.S. 
and the EU are parties to international IP agreements such as the Berne Convention and the 
TRIPS Agreement.  
In addition to these more general explanations for convergence in IP law between the EU 
and the U.S., I will now briefly analyze similarities and factors explaining the similarity 
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specifically in patent, copyright, and trademark law of the two jurisdictions under 
comparison. 
5.2.1.1 Patent Law 
The requirements of patentability for an invention are fairly similar both in Europe and in 
the U.S. In the U.S. the invention needs to fall within the scope of patentable subject matter, 
be useful, novel, and nonobvious.559 The EPC’s four criteria of patentability include novelty, 
involving an inventive step, capable of industrial application, and not excluded by Article 
52(2) and 3 of the EPC.560 The European criteria of ‘inventive step’ resembles its U.S. 
counterpart ‘nonobvious’ and ‘capable of industrial application’ is equivalent to ‘useful’ 
respectively.561  
Once again, analyzing historical evolution concerning patent law offers insight into 
understanding similarities between European and U.S. patent law. The Venetian Republic is 
thought to have enacted the first true patent statute in 1474 although this legislation codified 
even earlier practice.562 It included surprisingly similar elements compared to the current 
European and U.S. patentability requirements: the invention needed to be new, useful, and 
reduced to practice, and registration was required.563 From Renaissance Italy systematic state 
protection for intellectual property spread first to Continental Europe and later to England 
and by the 17th century, various European states had enacted similar patent legislation.564 
Through this common origin, the patent law in modern-day Europe and the U.S. are branches 
of a single system of jurisprudence which makes the similarity in patentability criteria more 
understandable.565 By applying the path dependence theory to patent law we see that the 
shaping of patent law has been influenced by evolutionary change of the past akin to 
evolution in nature.566 A similar yet distinct theoretical approach drawing originally also 
from biology, namely the concept of imprinting, suggests that early features persist beyond 
subsequent environmental changes, would lead to similar results explaining why patent law 
in the EU and the U.S. has remained surprisingly unaltered from its origins and consequently, 
                                                 
559 35 U.S.C. § 101–03. 
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similar to each other.567 Although path dependency has been used in earlier legal studies, to 
my knowledge, this study is one of the first to suggest that employing the theoretical concept 
of imprinting could also offer explanatory power in comparative legal studies. 
5.2.1.2 Copyright Law  
Although intellectual property rights are usually territorial in their effects, the basic elements 
of copyright protection, means to enforce copyright against infringement, and allowing the 
public to engage in the copyright owner’s exclusive rights for various reasons are similar in 
the EU and the U.S.568 Similar restrictions on copyright akin to the U.S., the fair use and first 
sale doctrine are found also in the EU copyright regime although under different names and 
with slight variations.569 One explanation to this identified similarity is that both copyright 
regimes try to achieve a balance with an inherent conflict: the legal rights of creators of 
copyrighted works and the fair use rights of the general public.570 Which goal weighs more 
may vary depending on the circumstances but at least the pendulum swings between these 
conflicting interests in both jurisdictions.571  
More specifically on the similarities of copyright, both in the EU and in the U.S., works must 
own some degree of originality in order to attract copyright protection.572 The Berne 
Convention contains no definition of originality but instead leaves the question of originality 
for courts to decide.573 How originality has been interpreted by courts in the EU and the U.S. 
bears resemblance as two distinct requirements for originality have been employed in both 
jurisdictions. The originality requirement was harmonized in the EU by the CJEU in a series 
of cases to mean ‘author’s own intellectual creation’.574 To identify an authorial work the 
CJEU relies on a two-stage test: first, the court evaluates whether the subject matter is of 
protectable type in a way that leaves scope for the exercise of free and creative choices in its 
creation.575 Secondly, the CJEU looks at whether the subject matter is protected, which 
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involves considering whether the creation involves the exercise of free and creative choices, 
and bears the personal mark of its creator.576 In the U.S. the Supreme Court has required 
originality to be both ‘independently created by the author’ and ‘with minimal degree of 
creativity’.577 Requirements for originality in the EU and the U.S. contain similar elements 
of creativity and independent work. This can be explained by the Berne Convention to which 
both are parties: even though ‘originality’ per se is not defined in the Berne Convention, 
‘original’ under the Convention is considered to have meant that the work reflects creativity, 
and that it is original instead of a copy.578  
Lastly, although often works resulting from artistic endeavor receive copyright protection, 
both in EU copyright black law and in the U.S. in case law, the stance has been taken that 
aesthetic appeal or merit per se is not or at least should not be considered as a necessary 
requirement for copyright.579 In practice though, in both jurisdictions judges struggle with 
ignoring the aesthetic value of a work while judging its eligibility for copyright protection.580  
5.2.1.3 Trademark Law 
Trademark law in the EU and the U.S. shares some similar features. Trademarks in the 
U.S. and the EU must be sufficiently distinctive to identify and distinguish the commercial 
source of goods or services from another source.581 
Blakely has somewhat boldly suggested that international harmonization of trademark law 
could be even accelerated by creating a global, unitary transnational trademark protection 
system to better meet the demands of global economy.582 Although his suggestion is yet to 
materialize, such a call exemplifies that even in today’s world, trademark laws around the 
world and for our purposes here, in the EU and the U.S., have converged to the degree that 
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such a suggestion is not outrageously utopist. However, even Blakely himself admits that 
his proposal faces various obstacles ranging from purely practical to theoretical and even 
to moral, he views a system modeled after the EU community trademark a viable option 
for future development of trademark law worldwide.583 If his or a similar initiative was to 
gain wider acceptance, such a transnational trademark protection system would 
approximate the trademark regimes of the EU and the U.S. even further. 
5.2.2 Similarities in Financial Markets Law 
5.2.2.1 Securities Law 
Despite differences in historical developments leading to the formation of the legal concept 
security, semantically the definition of a security within the EU and the U.S. is fairly 
similar.584 In a comparative legal and linguistic study, Castellano identified three core 
components of a security that were shared by both jurisdictions.585 He found that both in the 
U.S. and in the EU, securities are first, investments that are made to satisfy financing needs 
and return profits, secondly, these investments are negotiable in the primary and secondary 
market, and thirdly, they are valuable in the meaning that monetary appreciation is always 
possible.586 Castellano attributes this convergence to the high level of interconnectedness 
among these economies in a global world and to reliance on economic theory.587 
A plethora of comparative legal studies have contrasted insider trading laws in the U.S. and 
EU.588 Both the EU and the U.S. have taken a stance to prohibit insider trading on similar 
grounds: first, from a micro focus insider trading is seen in both jurisdictions as a breach of 
the fiduciary relationship of trust and confidence between the insider and the company, and 
from a macro focus, insider trading is seen to hinder allocation of recourses through price-
formation mechanism undermining market efficiency and investor confidence.589 The 
concept of ‘inside information’ as material non-public information appears to be more or 
less similar both in the EU and the U.S as materiality and publicity are defining elements of 
inside information in both jurisdictions.590 The similarities can be attributed to at least two 
main factors: first, the EU has deliberately sought to model some features of its securities 
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regulation modeling the U.S. This is not to say that the EU has bluntly copy-pasted its 
securities regulation from the 1933 and 1934 Acts and from U.S. Supreme Court case law, 
but the EU certainly has engaged in benchmarking U.S. securities regulation and 
prohibitions of insider trading. Secondly, the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) has produced a set of principles, known as the Objectives and 
Principles of Securities Regulation (IOSCO Principles) to establish a minimum level of 
uniformity for any national securities law.591 This standardization process has been guided 
by three main aims: protection of investors, fairness and transparency in securities markets, 
and reduction of systemic risk.592 As noted before, the first two of these objectives are also 
strongly reflected in the similar objectives of the EU and U.S. securities regulation.593 
5.2.2.2 Banking Law 
Mitigating moral hazard by subjecting banks to more effective market discipline has been a 
major underlying rationale for financial services policy in both the U.S. and Europe.594 
Additionally, Miller has argued that banking regulatory supervision and examination in the 
U.S. and Europe has significantly converged.595 Among reasons for this convergence, he 
attributes the shared impact of the financial crisis of 2007–09 as well as the tendency of bank 
regulators to engage in cooperation and consultation across borders.596 
In addition to sharing similar features, banking regulation both in the EU and the U.S. can 
be viewed as responses to crises so that each additional crises has added yet another layer of 
regulation with the promise of preventing the next crisis.597 It is as if banks and regulators 
play an endless game of cat and mouse where the actors in the banking industry try to bend 
the existing rules and the regulators seek to keep up with financial innovations and remedy 
regulatory gaps.  
A major underlying trend in banking regulation in the EU has been the allocation of power 
between the EU and its member states with gradual shift to the power of the EU with the 
EBU representing a major step towards centralization.598 Similarly, decentralization and 
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centralization have been competing forces in shaping the U.S. banking union to its current 
form.599 
5.3 Concluding Remarks 
Winston Churchill stated in a speech delivered in post-war Europe that the only way to 
achieve peace, safety, and freedom in Europe was through creating ‘a kind of United States 
of Europe’.600 More recently, Mario Draghi, the former president of the ECB, depicted EU 
financial supervision in the light of one of the aims of the U.S. Constitution, establishing ‘a 
more perfect Union’.601 Both Churchill’s and Draghi’s messages reflect the potential 
parallels between the EU and the U.S., while simultaneously the fact that Churchill’s vision 
remains unfulfilled, points to the vast differences in historical, linguistic, cultural, political, 
and economic context in the EU compared to the U.S.  
In this study I have analyzed IP law and financial markets law in the EU and the U.S. in 
comparative context. I have sought to address two interrelated questions, namely first, to 
what extent do IP law and financial markets law in the European Union and in the United 
States resemble each other and differ, and secondly, what possible factors explain 
similarities and differences in IP law and financial markets law in the European Union and 
in the United States? I find that similarities in IP law stem from international efforts to 
harmonize IPR protection as well as from common historical roots especially in patent law 
while differences are explained among others by underlying theoretical differences of IP 
doctrine, exemplified by the differing stances concerning the existence of moral rights. Also 
differences in the objective of IPR protection as well as the divide concerning the role of 
statutory law and case law between the common law and Romano-Germanic law explain 
some of the found differences. For instance, the patentability requirements and exclusions 
to patentability in the U.S. have been shaped by common law whereas in Europe 
patentability requirements are expressed mostly in positive law. Similarly, prohibitions of 
insider trading have been mostly developed through U.S. Supreme common law whereas in 
the EU prohibitions of insider dealing are set out by statutory requirements. 
Similarly to IP law, similarities in financial markets law can be explained by international 
efforts to assimilate financial but also by interconnectedness of both economies. Especially 
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Europeans have sought to model their securities regulation after the U.S. Banking law has 
been shaped in both jurisdictions by crises and efforts to balance between centralizing and 
decentralizing economic power. The differences in financial markets law stem from 
differences in investors, differing levels of integration of capital markets, and regulatory 
authority. The U.S. has been ahead of the EU in terms of more vibrant securities market 
overseen by a centralized securities regulator, the SEC, as well as having established doctrine 
on prohibitions of insider trading. In turn, the securities markets have remained less 
developed due to a host of impediments to cross-border transactions, long traditions of bank 
financing, reluctance of member states to adopt statutory prohibitions of insider dealing, and 
absence of a centralized regulatory and supervisory authority. In banking law, the U.S. 
banking union has developed over the last two centuries whereas the European banking 
union has only recently been introduced as a means to further financial integration of the 
EU. 
Due to the unique research design of the study with double comparison, that is comparing 
both two jurisdictions and distinct fields of law, I have been able to identify some reoccurring 
themes both in IP and financial markets law. First, the role of international organizations 
assimilating European and U.S. approaches to regulation became apparent in the course of 
this study. Both in IP law and in financial markets law, prominent international organizations 
have played a decisive role in setting a minimum standard in the given area of law. For 
instance, IOSCO Principles establish the minimum requirements for any national securities 
law whereas the TRIPS Agreement set a minimum level of protection of intellectual property 
rights.  
The tension between centralization and decentralization has also been evident on both sides 
of the Atlantic at different times in history. In copyright legislation as well as in financial 
integration, the EU has sought to create a unified, strong internal market while reconciling 
national interests of individual member states. Similarly, the path to establishing the Fed in 
the U.S. was marked by a battle between forces favoring centralization and those wanting to 
keep the economic power dispersed in individual states.  
On several occasions during this study I noted that legal terms can take on different meanings 
depending on the jurisdiction. Fundamental concepts such as ‘trademark’, ‘bank’, and 
‘security’ were found to have different yet similar meanings in the EU and the U.S.  
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Some of the central themes that emerged in the course of this study are summarized in Table 
1 with some illustrative but by no means exhaustive examples. 
   
Themes Force towards 
similarity or 
difference between the 
EU and the U.S. 
Examples from this study 
1. Convergence of laws 
through international treaties 
and organizations 
Similarity -Minimum requirements for any national securities law  
(IOSCO Principles) 
-Minimum level of protection of IPR (e.g. TRIPS, 
Berne) 
2. Economic interests driving 
legislative choices 
Similarity when affects 
ratifying international 
conventions, under 
other circumstances, 
can lead to similarities 
or differences 
- The EU has advocated strong protection of GIs due to 
having a diverse portfolio of GIs  
- When the U.S. was mainly an importer of intellectual 
property, it did not serve its economic interests to 
protect the rights of producers. As the importance of 
U.S. exports covered by conventional copyright 
increased, signing the Berne Convention made sense for 
enforcement of rights of U.S. artists in foreign nations 
3. Centralization vs. 
decentralization 
Unclear, can lead to 
similarities or 
differences  
-The Fed created late in the U.S. due to fears of 
centralized power 
-The EU’s path to creating an EBU through 
harmonization 
-Stagnation of the EU insider dealing regime due to 
reluctance of member states to adopt a statutory 
prohibition of insider dealing on the EU level 
4. Deceitfully similar yet 
content wise differing legal 
terms 
Similarity although can 
be different  
‘trademark’, ‘bank’, ‘security’ 
Table 1. Main themes of the comparative study. 
5.3.1 Suggestions for Further Research 
Building on this study, future studies could widen the scope of the comparison by increasing 
the amount of compared regions or countries while maintaining the substantive matter of 
comparison, IP and financial markets law. For instance, including China in the regions to be 
compared could offer a more nuanced comparison as China has gained a notorious reputation 
for having adopted a diverging outlook on the protection of IPR rights compared to most 
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industrialized countries.602 China’s mixed economy holds potential for an insightful 
comparison of regulation on financial markets as the supremacy of the market economy 
based approach hailed by the U.S. has been challenged by China’s strong economic growth 
despite embracing elements of both planned economy and market economy. In addition, the 
approach adopted in this study to include more than a legal concept or field of law 
exemplifies that conducting comparison on a wider scale, ‘meso-level comparison’, for lack 
of a better word, can be a fruitful approach to gain an overall picture of differences and 
similarities of fields of law while enabling comparisons both within regions/countries as well 
as within the fields of law themselves. Such additional comparative aspect can under some 
circumstances lead to unanticipated yet useful insights that might have otherwise been 
overlooked.  
In addition to the academic contributions of this study, the study has implications for 
practitioners of different sorts. First, the study offers a fairly comprehensive yet summarized 
analysis of the differences and similarities of the EU and the U.S. law in the fields of IP law 
and in the area of financial markets law. The systematization resulting from this study can 
in and of itself add value for practitioners wishing to gain a perspective into the divergence 
and convergence of the studied fields. This study could serve as a starting point for a 
corporate lawyer considering whether to initiate the IPO process in the U.S. or within the 
EU in his or her client’s behalf. Companies considering the pros and cons of either filing for 
a patent in the U.S. or in an EU member state could equally find the insights from this 
comparative study useful.  
5.3.2 Limits of My Language — Limits of This Study 
I have aimed at conducting a systematic and impartial comparison of the relevant law in the 
EU and the U.S. The findings of this study are, however, one possible interpretation of the 
differences and similarities of IP and financial markets law of the EU and the U.S. Although 
I do not subscribe to a strict Legrandian view that the task of a comparatist in understanding 
a foreign legal system, ‘the other’, is a mere impossibility, some of my possible 
preconceptions might have colored the conclusions. Yet I have found some relief in the 
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realization that striving for otherness-awareness might have at least reduced some of the 
biases inherent in this study.  
The main language used in analyzing legislation and case law has been English. Although I 
have striven for accuracy in using legal terms, the familiarity of some words from ordinary 
use surely has at times deceived me into false sense of Verstehen.603 This is aligned with 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s famous notion of language as a boundary condition in that, ’The 
limits of my language stand for the limits of my world’.604 Slightly modified, I conclude that 
the limits of my language stand for the limits of my world of legal thinking. 
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